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LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY
Jeremiah A. Ho ∗
ABSTRACT
Our conceptions of law affect how we objectify the law and
ultimately how we study it.
Despite a century’s worth of
theoretical progress in American law—from legal realism to
critical legal studies movements and postmodernism—the
formalist conception of “law as science,” as promulgated by
Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in the latenineteenth century, continues to influence the inductive
methodologies used today to impart knowledge in American legal
education. This lasting influence of the Langdellian scientific
conception of law has persisted even as the present crisis in legal
education has engendered other reforms. However, subsequent
movements of legal thought have revealed that the law is neither
scientific nor “objective” in the way the Langdellian formalists
once envisioned. After all, the Langdellian scientific objectivity of
law itself reflected the dominant class, gender, power, and race of
its nineteenth-century progenitors.
Thus, by sustaining the
illusion of scientific objectivity, the continued application of
Langdellian pedagogy distorts our understandings of law and
abridges individual explorations of pluralism, subjectivity, justice,
and empowerment. Such prevailing false notions of neutrality in
law leads to both disenchantment and hierarchy in legal practice,
but worse it also distracts from meanings of law that would
otherwise have led to empowerment and critique. In this way,
legal scholars have clamored for a post-Langdellian legal
conception to enable us to reach more relevant and emboldened
meanings in law.
Prompted by such calls amidst the post-Recession crisis in
the American legal academy, this Article offers such a new
conception for theorizing meanings in law by locating law within
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its instrumentalities. “Law as instrumentality” obtains meaning
by accepting law’s fragmentation and then observing, from
fragmentation, the characteristics of its agency. The law is not a
science; but it does embody human-made qualities of agency. This
new instrumentality conception studies law’s deliberate aesthetics
as a way to explore law ontologically and critique its goals, its
devices, its intentions, its significances, and its teleologies. From
this conception, a broader methodology can arise to bring about a
more relevant and empowering understanding of law to those who
render it to life.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For better or worse, examples demonstrating the age-old
observation that lawyers are typically a pessimistic lot 1 have
reared themselves noticeably during this present crisis in
American legal academy and education2—a period that has
See Martin E.P. Seligman, et. al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 Cardozo
L. Rev. 33, 39-41 (2001) (characterizing lawyers as pessimistic and describing
the causes of such pessimism in lawyers).
2 See, e.g., Megan McArdle, The Perils of Law School: A Chat with Paul
Campos, Author of DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL!, THE DAILY BEAST (Sept. 24,
2012). In the interview, Campos states: “Yes indeed, but the waterline has now
1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952077

2017]

LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY

3

drifted perilously on tides of the Great Recession. 3 Observations
based on popular psychology tend to avoid being completely
truthful on a particular subject. 4 Every once in a while, however,
an observation reveals a beacon of truth. 5 Not long after national
enrollment amongst law schools began to decline and the outside
world took notice with scrutiny in 2011, 6 the word, “crisis,” was
first uttered within the legal academy. 7 From its initial nervous
whisper, this utterance of crisis did not go unheard. 8 At first,
there were defensive stances of denial. 9
Very shortly,
nonetheless, the facade of denial gave way to reveal a deep sense
of anxiety—the contagious kind that spreads rapidly amongst a

risen so high that large portions of the classes at top ten law schools are
struggling,
so
now
there’s
a
“crisis.”).
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/24/the-perils-of-law-school.html.
3 Jordan Weissmann, What Do Lawyers and Bankers Have in Common?
They Lost Jobs in 2011, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Jan. 10, 2012, 1:30 PM
EST), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/what-do-lawyersand-bankers-have-incommon-they-lost-jobs-in-2011/251130/#.
4 See Peter Brooks, Law, Therapy, Culture, 13 Yale J.L. & Human. 227, 237
(2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s substituting of “popular psychology” for
“common sense” in a criminal decision as “rhetorical self-blinding”); see also
Mary L. Tenopyra, A Scientist-Practitioner’s Viewpoint on the Admissibility of
Behavioral and Social Scientific Information, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 194,
197 (1999) (maintaining that “popular psychology that obtains considerable
publicity is often at odds with scientific psychology”).
5 Kevin W. Saunders, The Framers, Children, and Free Expression, 25
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 187, 235 (2011) (noting how academic
psychology and popular psychology are something in accord).
6 Jordan Weissmann, What Do Lawyers and Bankers Have in Common?
They Lost Jobs in 2011, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, (Jan. 10, 2012, 1:30 PM
EST). http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/what-do-lawyersand-bankers-have-incommon-they-lost-jobs-in-2011/251130/#.
7 McArdle, supra note __.
8 See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Crises, Crisis Rhetoric, and the Competition in
Legal Education: A Sociological Perspective on the (Latest) Crisis of the Legal
Profession and Legal Education, 24 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 503 (2013); Paul
Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 177
(2012).
9 David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan.
8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/09law.html (“But
improbably enough, law schools have concluded that life for newly minted
grads is getting sweeter. . . . How do law schools depict a feast amid so much
famine?”).
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group of pessimistic individuals. 10 Once the anxiety set in, the
halls of the American legal academy, as narrow as they are
hallowed, served as an echo chamber, repeating and amplifying
and ruminating over the notion of crisis until the noise became a
Then not long after, distress
collective cry of distress. 11
crystallized into action by law school and university
administrations and much of it was swift in a corporate sense:
cut-backs on faculty scholarship monies, 12 buy-outs, 13 rebuke, 14
rumors of school closures, 15 reduction in staff, 16 and pull-backs on
faculty hiring 17 to name a few. Simultaneously, a series of how-to
reform legal education articles and books bombarded the

Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, THE NEW YORK
TIMES (July 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/anexistential-crisis-for-law-schools.html
(“Law schools have hustled to
compensate for these shifts by trying to make it look as if their graduates are
more marketable, even hiring them as research assistants to offer temporary
employment. But those strategies won’t fix legal education. . . .”).
11 ABA Commission on the Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Profession
and Legal Needs, The Value Proposition of Attending Law School, (2011)
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/lsd/legaled/value.authc
heckdam.pdf.
12 Fabio Arcila Jr., The Future of Scholarship in Law Schools, 31 Touro L.
Rev. 15, 19 (2014) (“In the past few years, these scholarship incentives have
been reduced or withdrawn, a trend that is likely to continue into the
foreseeable future.”).
13 Mary Moore, New England Law offers Faculty Buyouts, Dean takes Pay
BUSINESS
JOURNAL
(Nov.
1,
2013),
Cut,
BOSTON
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2013/10/29/new-england-law-deanpay-buyout.html.
14 See, e.g., Robin West, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE
DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM 17 (2014) (“[L]aw schools’ current business
model is not only unsustainable but also immoral.”).
15 Ashby Jones and Jennifer Smith, Amid Falling Enrollment, Law Schools
Are Cutting Faculty, THE WALL STREET J. (July 15, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873236642045786078102924332
72 (reporting law schools faculty lay-offs after “having trimmed staff”).
16 Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Schools Cope with Declining Enrollment by
J.
(July
16,
2013)
Quietly
Cutting
Faculty,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_schools_cope_with_declining_enro
llment_by_quietly_cutting_faculty.
17 Law Schools Put Hiring Freeze on Faculty, NEW JERSEY BUSINESS (Oct.
12, 2012) http://www.njbiz.com/article/20121012/NJBIZ01/121019932/lawschools-put-hiring-freeze-on-faculty.
10
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literature. 18 A blame game began to surface from all directions. 19
On a day-to-day level at law schools, reports of pandemonium and
fury, and long days and nights at the office were not uncommon. 20
In studying all of these events as part of classic pessimistic
behavior, these responses should not surprise ourselves; in times
of real or perceived crisis, pessimists (lawyers and law professors
included) will often abandon ship, reach for a raft of security, and
internalize obsessively about self-preservation—all the while
hopefully searching for a new course. 21
At first, internalization from within the legal academy
came most notably from Brian Tamanaha and his book, Failing
Law Schools, 22 which prominently attempted to explain the
economic causes of the post-Recession law school crisis. 23
Although Tamanaha was not the only one critiquing law schools
from a financial perspective, 24 his work was arguably the most
widely read and discussed. 25 In Failing Law Schools, Tamanaha

See, e.g., Farida Ali, Globalizing the U.S. Law School Curriculum: How
Should Legal Educators Respond?, 41 Int’l J. Legal Info. 249 (2013); Beverly
Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education, 62 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 643 (2013); Anthony V. Alfieri, Educating Lawyers for Community,
2012 Wis. L. Rev. 115 (2012).
19 See Paul Campos, Stop Blaming the Law School Bubble on the 2007
Financial Crisis, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2013); Bruce Feldthusen, Legal
Profession
in
Turmoil:
Let’s
Blame
the
Law
Schools,
(Dec.
3,
2012),
CANADIANLAWYERMAG.COM
http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/4429/Legal-profession-in-turmoil-Letsblame-the-law-schools.html.
20 Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law Schools Disappoints Law
Students, The Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 219,
236 (2007) (“It should come as no surprise that the ABA committees that set
law school standards are dominated by those who have succeeded and are
comfortable in the current system: law school deans and professors.”).
21 See F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit (1988).
22 Brian Z. Tamanaha, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
23 See generally id.
24 See e.g., PAUL CAMPOS, DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS): A LAW
PROFESSOR’S GUIDE TO MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012);
Paul Campos, The Crisis of the American Law School, 46 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 177 (2012).
25 See generally David Burk, Book Review, 63 J.L. EDUCATION 349 (2013);
Charles Lane, Book Review: ‘Failing Law Schools’ by Brian Z. Tamanaha¸THE
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2012). https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book18
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argued that the post-Recession law school crisis had essentially
two culprits. First, law school tuitions had surpassed inflation to
amounts that heavily burdened students with outstanding debt
upon graduation. 26 He culled through much empirical data to
demonstrate the phenomena of this debt-to-inflation ratio. 27 But
even as he cites an anecdotal example by comparing different
generations of law students, his point was rather illustrative:
Law students in the seventies and early eighties who
worked at corporate law firms during the summer
could earn enough to cover the following year’s
tuition and perhaps some living expenses. This
helped keep down the level of debt. Despite the
dramatic increase in staring associate pay at
corporate law firms that occurred in the early 2000s,
the best-paying summer jobs today, which few
students land, generate enough income for a student
to pay half, at most, of one year’s tuition at a top
school. 28
Such debt-to-inflation ratios, Tamanaha observed, would impede
upon new law school graduates’ options as they move into their
careers. 29 Money, after all, gives one options in employment and
life-style. But he was not finished yet; another casual reason for
the crisis, Tamanaha observed, was that post-graduation
employment levels at law schools were in jeopardy. 30 The
shrunken post-2008 legal job market was not able to allow the
adequate match between the number of attorney jobs available
and the number of new graduates that law schools were
producing. 31 According to Tamanaha, instead of reducing the size
of classes, “[l]aw schools responded to this abysmal job
environment by increasing the number of students they enrolled
review-failing-law-schools-by-brian-z-tamanaha/2012/08/03/e7054c9c-c6df11e1-916d a4bc61efcad8_story.html?utm_term=.9a436e554f0b.
26 See Tamanaha, supra note __, at 136-40.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 109.
29 See e.g. id at 111-12 (citing an example with a law student named
“Sarah”).
30 Id. at 145-60.
31 Id.
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in 2009, and yet again in 2010—thereby promising to throw out
even more law graduates onto the saturated employment pool
three years hence.” 32 Of course, he was not the sole voice to make
these inspections on law school business practices. Critics, both
within legal education and beyond, similarly targeted the
economics of law schools during this era of crisis. 33
This opportunity for deep internalization in legal
education, led by Tamanaha’s book, also prompted and stoked
critiques of other aspects of legal education, particularly in the
effects that recent cultural and generational shifts in law
students have had on law schools and professionalism, 34 and also
on the uses of new technology in law teaching. 35 At first, the
discussion of cultural and curricular reform in law schools—
particularly ones that resembled the Carnegie Report, 36
MacCrate, 37 and Best Practices 38—going into the Great Recession
were sidelined briefly for a time, perhaps as the academy’s
attention was honing in on too-big-to-fail characterizations of law
school business and marketing practices rather than pedagogical
reforms. 39 But as interest in the economic narratives of law
Id. at 167.
See generally Steven J. Harper, THE LAWYER BUBBLE (2013); William D.
Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 461 (2013); Paul Campos,
DON’T GO TO LAW SCHOOL (UNLESS): A LAW PROFESSOR’S INSIDE GUIDE TO
MAXIMIZING OPPORTUNITY AND MINIMIZING RISK (2012).
34 Emily A. Benfer & Colleen F. Shanahan, Educating the Invincibles:
Strategies for Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School, 20 NYU
Clinical L. Rev. 1 (2013); Susan Swaim Daicoff, Expanding the Lawyer’s
Toolkit of Skills and Competencies: Synthesizing Leadership, Professionalism,
Emotional Intelligence, Conflict Resolution, and Comprehensive Law, 52 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 795 (2012).
35 Brittany Stringfellow Otey, Millennials, Technology, and Professional
Responsibility: Training a New Generation in Technological Professionalism,
37 J. Legal Prof. 199 (2013).
36 William M. Sullivan et al., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
37 American Bar Association, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 138-41 (1992)
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
38 Roy Stuckey et al., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
39 See Dolin, supra note __, at 231 (“Langdell’s method endures because,
although his pedagogy no longer makes sense, his system makes money.”).
32
33
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schools began to even out, scholarly discussions regarding the old
skills-versus-doctrinal debate in law teaching reignited—
particularly because, in light of low employment statistics, the
teaching of skills would, in theory, contribute to the competency
and employability of students and graduates. 40 Still that shift
proceeded cautiously, and some articles in advocating skills and
practice during this time took on a neoliberalist tone. 41 Others in
the academy, such as Edward Rubin and Robin West, have called
for more profound changes to the core philosophy of American law
teaching and pedagogy at this time instead. 42 However, such
critical observations have seemed to have taken a backseat for
more short-term solutions on teaching skills because an overhaul
of legal pedagogy would require a deeper connection drawn
amongst perspectives on the meaning of law itself and its
underlying theory. 43 In short, despite all the crisis-talk and
inward obsessions, the current subject matter of teaching of law
students has a large body of technical insight and pedagogical
discourse, but lack any unifying sense of what modern law schools
ought to look like beyond the nineteenth-century model
promulgated by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School. 44
There have been some meaningful changes. As an era of
reckoning drew near, accountability—moral and economic—came
fast upon the academy like swift justice. Questions of relevance
regarding American law schools and traditional legal education
has steered many law schools to quickly add phrases such as
“practice-ready” and “experiential learning” alongside their
traditional curricular programming and offerings in order to
demonstrate that their current and prospective students would
See, e.g., Ali, supra note ___; Petersen Jennison, supra note __.
Margaret Thornton, Legal Education in the Corporate University, 10
Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 19, 23 (2014) (discussing that in law schools the
“discourse of skills also carries a subtext with it . . . with the term often being
‘used interchangeably with capacity, knowledge, expertise and so forth’ and
that ‘[s]kills tend to play a special role in the neoliberal labor market and are
priviled over critical and theoretical knowledge.” (citation omitted)).
42
Edward Rubin, The Future and Legal Education: Are Law Schools
Failing and, If So, How?, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 499, 507 (2014) [hereinafter
Rubin, Future and Legal Education]; West, supra note ___, at 23.
43 See Dolin, supra note __, at 247.
44 West, supra note __, at 27-35.
40
41
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get their monies’ worth. 45 In earnest, law school institutions had
thoughtful intentions when they strengthened such parts of the
law school experience that had been previously auxiliary. 46 In
theory and practice, this first wave of change had positive effects.
Building up clinical legal education, externship, and pro bono
requirements at law schools facilitates law graduate competency
and, hopefully, marketability. 47
They also reflect an
acknowledgement that law practice is something one learns, in
part, by doing. After all, was it not Holmes who said that the life
of the law was not merely logic but also experience? 48
And then there were changes that were a bit more
questionable.
A second wave of change came along that
mandated learning assessments in legal education. 49 In 2015, the
American Bar Association (hereinafter “ABA”) passed Standards
301, 302, 314, and 315 that required law schools to conduct
learning assessments, 50 and subsequently the law schools began
to obey. 51 Although some in the academy have urged for decades
for law schools to implement learning assessments while others
have vilified assessments, 52 the crisis precipitated the ABA to
pass what had only been a proposal and now all law schools began
in-house assessments of student learning and competency. 53 The
undergraduate campuses of colleges and universities had been
See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Learning Communities: A New Model for
Legal Education, 7 Elon L. Rev 193 (2015).
46 See Marjorie A. Silver, Symposium Introduction: Humanism Goes to
Law School, 28 Touro L. Rev. 1141 (2012) (“Among other changes designed to
expose students to what lawyers actually do in practice, we incorporated a
requirement . . . that each of us spend a significant portion of the course
teaching our students about alternatives to litigation.”).
47 See generally Knauer, supra note __.
48 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
49 American Bar Association, 2015-2016 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 15-25 (2015).
50 Id.
51 David Thomson, When the ABA Comes Calling, Let’s Speak the Same
Language Assessment, 23 Perspectives: Teaching Legal Res. & Writing 68
(2014).
52 Cf. Gregory S. Munro, Outcomes Assessment for Law Schools (2000), with
Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are Coming to A
Law School Near You-What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes &
Assessment, 16 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 605, 610 (2010).
53 Pistone & Horn, supra note ___.
45
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engaged in these practices since the early 1980s. 54 So when
American legal education began to embrace the assessments
movement in higher education, some suggested this embrace
signified that law schools had finally caught up with the rest of
Conferences regarding
American higher education. 55
assessments have, since then, taken place on various law school
campuses nationwide. 56 Faculty exchange of assessment rubrics
have become more commonplace. 57
Thoughts of distilling
teaching and pedagogy into metrics and measurables have
consumed much faculty governance, of late. On the surface, the
learning assessment movement offers a solution with the theme
of accountability prevalent during law schools in crisis-mode,
particularly because law schools had been famous for lacking
little assessment action. 58 Law schools can now claim that they
are being thoughtful or self-reflective in response to questions
about relevance that have existed in past several decades of law
teaching.
After redesigning business models and career
engagement, measuring how law is taught and what students
learn seems like one method to address the curricular and
pedagogical issues that have haunted American legal education
for decades—issues that many have highlighted as reasons law
schools have become irrelevant in the wake of the post-recession.
Perhaps this was an apt time to show the world that American
legal education was finally on the move.
Peter T. Ewell, ASSESSMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND IMPROVEMENT:
REVISITING THE TENSION 5 (2009) (citing Peter T. Ewell, Assessment,
Accountability, and Improvement: Managing the Contradiction (1987)); Dolin,
supra note ___, at 224.
55 Anthony Niedwiecki, Law Schools and Learning Outcomes: Developing A
Coherent, Cohesive, and Comprehensive Law School Curriculum, 64 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 661, 664 (2016) (“In light of these fundamental changes, criticisms,
recommendations, and requirements, law schools must now be more deliberate
in the planning of their curriculum so it is coherent, cohesive, and
comprehensive.”).
56 See, e.g., April 2014: Assessment Across the Curriculum (conference),
FOR
LAW
TEACHING
&
LEARNING
(Apr.
2014),
INST.
http://lawteaching.org/conferences/april-2014-assessment-across-thecurriculum/.
57 See, e.g., Resources, INST. FOR LAW TEACHING & LEARNING (last visited
Mar. 5, 2014), http://lawteaching.org/resources/.
58 Ron M. Aizen, Four Ways to Better 1L Assessments, 54 Duke L.J. 765,
767 (2004).
54
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But while many have written about the pros and cons of
assessment and explored exactly how how to assess, few people
have contemplated the big, existential “So what?” questions to
ask once law schools have done their assessments. What exactly
are we trying to find through assessments? And will we find it?
Genuine, thoughtful motivations to perform in-house assessments
keep law schools accountable, but political motivations for
requiring assessments is not a moral response to the law school
crisis. In this way, over-blown, chest-pounding hopes that
assessments will overhaul American legal education ought to be
suspect and tamed.
The assessments movement in legal
education is only skin-deep; it is a new fad. Not only that, but the
fad is one that officially ushers the view that law schools are now
part of the age of neoliberalism and corporatized higher education
institutions. 59 Should all of this give pessimists some pause?
Absolutely. To be sure, done earnestly and correctly, learning
assessments offer much utility to improve quality education. The
process is short-sighted when we neglect what we will do after the
results of assessment have come in, but rather allow our results
to skew responses that all is good with our status quo. In this
way, the assessment process is also not completely objective and
scientific.
This Article is about answering the yearning for a lasting,
meaningful change to American law teaching philosophy in this
time of crisis for American law schools. As Robin West has
articulated, “just as [w]e cannot address our economic crisis in a
meaningful way without the existential, we cannot do the inverse
of that either.” 60 A little over a century’s time of establishing and
formalizing a significant tradition of American legal education
has passed. 61 Yet still, law schools continue to impart knowledge
and training using a pedagogy steeped in the nineteenth
century 62—while the current state of the law and law practice has
surpassed a reliance on the common law, and while predominant
ways of reaching doctrinal resolutions to new controversies and
See Bonnie Urciuoli, The Language of Higher Education Assessment:
Legislative Concerns in A Global Context, 12 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 183,
183-84 (2005).
60 West, supra note __, at 212.
61 Peterson Jennison, supra note ___, at 646.
62 Dolin, supra note __, at 222.
59
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disputes do not always rely on reading ancient and seminal
appellate decisions. It is no wonder why lawyers are pessimistic.
We are taught to be that way as an indirect result of our current
pedagogy. 63 The optimistic silver lining in this time of crisis
ought to have been a moment of clarity that allowed us to
examine with critical and scholarly eyes what relevance a
methodology guided by “law as science,” in the Langdellian sense,
remained presently. How we envision the law manifests in the
pedagogy and methods of its study. What this Article offers is a
new paradigm for conceptualizing meaning in law for the
purposes to engender more relevance and empowerment—one
that can navigate beyond assessments, but more importantly,
allow individuals to think rigorously and learn about the law in a
more current and meaningful way. This Article’s ultimate
recommendation for the American legal academy is toward a postLangdellian conception of law that perceives and defines law by
its deliberate instrumentalities, rather as a form of science. The
ensuing pages, hopefully, will clarify the meaning of that
heuristic shared by this Article’s title, “law as instrumentality.”
Apart from this Part I Introduction, Part II of this Article
will discuss the specific history and background of American legal
education and the rise of the Langdellian case method pedagogy
in American law schools. Part III will then examine the case
method’s effects on modern-day students. Finally, before the
Article’s conclusion, Part IV will introduce the instrumentality
conception of law and its underlying philosophy that shifts away
from the unified and scientific paradigm of the Langdellian
scientific conception by theorizing law from fragmentation and
then gathering meaning from the human-made aspects of law’s
agency. A brief exploration of what a law classroom situated by
“law as instrumentality” might look like pedagogically will also
occur in Part IV as well.
In its intentions, the Article seeks out to theorize the type
of deep and profound reform that not only will help restrain the
pessimists from jumping ship but changes that American legal
education deserves.

63

Dolin, supra note __, at 222.
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II. THE GHOST SHIP OF LANGDELLIAN FORMALISM
A. Origin and Influence in Methodology
Our inquiry begins by lowering our sails in the late
nineteenth century. Especially in the last several decades of
historicism, some debate has emerged regarding the complete and
total attribution of the case method to Christopher Langdell. 64
Although scholars have documented and mapped out a general
insight regarding Langdell’s law teachings, philosophy, and
tenure at Harvard Law School, 65 some have suggested that much
sifting and combing is still needed but may never be completely
done in terms of a comprehensive study of the man. 66 After all,
the archives at Harvard house some 7,000 pages of Langdell’s
own notes, taken on loose-leaf in his illegible hand, a majority of
which remains yet to be deciphered. 67 Additionally, another
several thousand pages of his papers were purposely destroyed in
the 1940s, perhaps as suggested in a reactionary fit of the legal
realists, based on ideologies splits from the formalists. 68 All in
all, not unlike our knowledge of many other figures in history,
See Bruce A Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of
Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 Law & Hist. Rev. 277, 296–97 (2004). Kimball
notes that “[p]articularly in regard to [Langdell’s] signature teaching method,
the revisionists maintained that Langdell did not invent case method or that, if
he did, then he did not really practice it or that, if he invented and practiced it,
then he really did not understand its nature and purpose. Demonstrated by
their inconsistency, the purpose of these efforts was apparently to elevate a
revered mentor, as in the case of Beale, or the favorite son of a law school, as
with Columbia or Mississippi, or generally to demonstrate that “not literally all
good things are first thought of in Cambridge.” (quoting Alfred Z. Reed,
Training for the Public Profession of the Law (New York: Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Teaching, 1921), Bulletin no. 15, p. 372.).
65 See generally id.
66 See id. at 330-31.
67 Id. at 281.
68 See id. Kimball observed that “some 3,000 papers—possibly including
letters, financial records, and lectures—were discarded in 1941” and that “this
literal trashing of Langdell occurred contemporaneously with the high tide of
Holmes’s ‘hagiography.’ “ Id. Kimball later described the hagiography of
Holmes as period when the legal realists interjected “a uniformly derogatory
view of Langdell” that peaked at a “high water mark” with the destruction of
Langdell’s papers when the realists dominated American legal thought. Id. at
304-05.
64
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there will always be something unknowable and incomplete in
our understanding of Langdell and his contributions to modern
American legal education. 69 Over the years, that gap in our
conscious knowledge of Langdell has likely supported our awe, 70
our reverence, 71 our vilification, 72 our parody, 73 and our revision
of his legacy 74—for whatever goals such reactions have served our
purposes. 75 Ultimately, however, such endeavors always fail in
obtaining a definitive truth of the matter. We can never really
know a person. 76
Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Osler, Langdell, and the Atelier: Three Tales of
Creation in Professional Education, 10 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JALWD 151,
185 (2013) (“[I]n the legal profession for which he invented the signature
pedagogical method, Langdell is virtually unknown.”).
70 Austen G. Fox, Professor Langdell—His Personal Influence, 20 Harv. L.
Rev. 7-8 (1906) (eulogizing Langdell by noting at the start of his teaching at
Harvard students knew “that a great teacher had come among us and we were
led to seek you out”).
71 William LaPiana, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 168-69 (1994) (defending
Langdell against criticisms of his contributions to legal education and the case
method).
72 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev.
907, 907- 08 (1933) (painting Langdell as misguided in his practice of law and
how that translated to some of his development of the case method and why
“[d]ue to Langdell’s idiosyncracies, law school law came to mean ‘library-law’ “).
73 Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACTS 5 1974 (famously beginning
his book with a remark about the centennial development of Langdell’s work
on contracts, specifically observing that “[i]t was just a hundred years ago that
Christopher Columbus Langdell, like his namesake four centuries earlier, set
sail over uncharted seas and inadvertently discovered a New World”) (citations
omitted).
74 See Kimball, supra note ___, at 311 (observing that during the midtwentieth century, “the scholarship on Langdell had ignored most of the
evidence that would normally be considered in a scholarly analysis of a
historical figure”).
75 See e.g. Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting
Langdell, 64 J. Legal Educ. 656 (2015) (using Langdell as a counterpoint for
developing active learning methods); see also Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 42 (1977) (“[I]f Langdell had not existed, we would have had to invent
him.”); Gilmore, Death of Contract, supra note ___, at 13 n. 20 (“Professor
Sutherland reproduces an astonishing portrait of Langdell (“painted . . . in the
twenty-second year of [His] deanship”) which could perfectly well be a portrait
of the original Christopher Columbus.”).
76 See e.g. John Henry Schlegel, Book Review of Kronman, Anthony, The
Lost Lawyer & LaPiana, William, Logic and Experience, 14 Law & History
Review 369 (1996). In comparing two books on Langdell, Schlegel observes
69
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Of course, a funny irony one might draw from all of this is
a parallel between the futility of completely getting to know a
person, such as Langdell, and the way in which Langdell’s
nineteenth-century theorizing of law as science itself—presuming
law to be unified and complete in nature, formalist and objective
in approach 77—had its own futility and shortcomings as well. 78
The philosophical wheels in one’s mind can readily churn away at
reconciling those observations; but whatever shortcomings and
contestations exist over fully crediting Langdell with the case
method in American law schools, all controversies steps aside for
the fact that such a pedagogy has defined American law teaching
for over a century’s time. 79 That observation is, indeed, true with
ample examples to bolster it. 80 Arising in the 1870s, the case
method was one of the features of the new law school model in
American universities, promoted strongly by Harvard Law School
through the teachings and innovations of Langdell. 81 Although
the use of appellate opinions in law teaching was not necessarily
new, 82 the case method’s wholesale pedagogical emphasis on court
opinions was embraced as a novelty for the study of law, 83 which
itself was fast becoming an academic discipline during this
how one book’s context was “infinitely deeper” than the other’s but was still
“simply not deep enough. No one’s ever is, of course.” Id. at 372.
77 West, supra note __, at 71 n. 70 (noting that the Langdellian formalists
believed in the “autonomy and completeness of the common law: the common
law was autonomous from all other legal orders as well as from all other
sources of authority, whether cultural or political, and it was sufficient to
answer all questions, not just most”).
78 Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human
Subject, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 227, 249 (2002) (describing that “[w]hile imputing the
prestige of science to law, Langdell and those in his image simply fail to tell us
exactly what the ‘legal scientist’ is doing to know law’s ‘axioms.’ “).
79 Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36
Vill. L. Rev. 517, 520-21 (1991).
80 See id.at 527-31 (discussing Langdell’s influence on the ideology of law as
science and how that was taught to students at Harvard); see also id at 531
(describing Langdell’s development of the casebook); id. at 532 (discussing
Langdell’s recasting of the “professor’s role” in the classroom through the
Socratic method).
81 Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 468 (3d ed. 2005).
82 James Williard Hurst, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 261 (1950); Robert Stevens, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICAN FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 52 n. 14 (1983).
83 Id. at 52-53.
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time. 84 Summarily, the case method’s features involve the use of
appellate court cases to demonstrate common law principles
within a specific body of law. 85 Its signature classroom technique
is two-fold: first, in the use of heavily-edited casebooks that
contain appellate decisions selected to authoritatively illustrate a
legal principle, and secondly, in the classroom use of the Socratic
dialogue of inquiry-and-answer between lecturer and students,
where the lecturer would question students on assigned case
decisions and hypotheticals in order to extract significant legal
rules and principles. 86
Along with the eventual rise in prominence of Harvard’s
law school, the case method—as employed by Langdell and his
peers there—received gradual widespread adoption in the lecture
rooms at other law schools in the country. 87 At first, other
competing law schools were reluctant to use the method. 88
Eventually, over the twentieth century, however, the case
method’s popularity gradually gained traction and the acceptance
of the method at law schools nationwide was systemic. 89 In
modern-day American law schools, the Langdellian case method,
despite augmentation with the problem method and other
teaching techniques, still endures as the dominant form of
instruction in classrooms. 90 Internationally, the case method has
its followers at law programs in other countries as well. 91 Its
influence in modeling and developing generations of American
law faculty has been profound. 92 And even pop-culturally, the
Id. at 52.
Id. at 52-53.
86 Philip C. Kissam, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF
MODERN LAWYERS 37-50 (2003).
87 Weaver, supra note ___, at 596 n. 70.
88 See id. at 541-42 (describing how “[t]he transition began slowly” and
mentioning that in 1894, the ABA had reported that the lecture method was
still prevalent in law instruction).
89 See Stevens, supra note ___, at 64 (observing statistically the rise in
number of law schools in the early 1900s adopting the case method); see also
Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education,
62 Cath. U. L. Rev. 643, 646–47 (2013).
90 Weaver, supra note __, at 543-45.
91 E.g., Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.Inspired Transplants, 59 J. Legal Educ. 60, 76 (2009).
92 Id. at 544.
84
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case method’s notorious dialogic style of classroom teaching has
seen its most acerbic Hollywood screen variants 93
But despite being a teaching method with only two major
signature characteristics or components (the casebook and the
Socratic dialogue), these characteristics, in principle, underscore
a larger conception of the law, one that was both personal to
Langdell and reflective of the post-Antebellum age of American
law and law schools: Langdell’s case method was grounded in the
formalist notion of law as science. 94 This conception embodied in
an ideal of scientific methods as applied to the study and practice
of law, which Langdell considered as a scientific entity in nature.
The belief was that the result of this application would lead one to
discover paradigmatic legal principles within the world and its
disputes. 95 Although the “law-as-science” conception was not
likely original to Langdell, his notion of law as science possessed
a certain rational empiricism that would have facilitated
inquiries upon the law with favor toward a nineteenth-century
scientific methodology. 96 So as science, the law must be studied
E.g. Legally Blonde (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001); The Paper Chase
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1973).
94 Friedman, supra note ___, at 468-69.
95 See Nancy Cook, Law As Science: Revisiting Langdell’s Paradigm in the
21st Century, 88 N.D. L. Rev. 21, 22 (2012).
96 M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell,
30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95, 119 (1986). Hoeflich notes that Langdell’s approach
“had two components: empiricism and rationalism.” Id. In fact, such attributes
added to the method’s appeal with the figures at Harvard during Langdell’s
time:
93

It was the empirical aspect of Langdell’s concept that was
most consonant with Harvard President Eliot’s and other
contemporaries’ ideas about science. Science was something
that one did. The term connoted investigation and
experimentation. Thus, Langdell argued that jurists and legal
scholars were also empirical investigators. They sought for
legal principles rather than physical rules. The sources of their
raw data were not chemical compounds or heavenly bodies, but
rather legal facts, facts to be found in appellate cases. The
rational aspect of the Langdellian notion of legal science dovetailed with the empirical aspect. The rational aspect of the
Langdellian model quite simply was the belief that legal
reasoning must be deductive.
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accordingly. The oft-examined quotation from the preface of his
original casebook on contract law alludes to the way Langdell
conflated his scientific conception of the law with the learning of
it:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of
these as to be able to apply them with constant
facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer;
and hence to acquire that mastery should be the
business of every earnest student of law. Each of
these doctrines has arrived at its present state by
slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth,
extending in many cases through centuries. This
growth is to be traced in the main through a series of
cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only
way of mastering the doctrine effectually is by
studying the cases in which it is embodied. 97
Scholars and critics alike have linked Langdell’s conception of the
law with the other developments at Harvard Law that were
auxiliary and yet consistent to the rise of the case method in the
lecture hall. For instance, the law library’s development as an
important and central space in the law school, akin to the
Other
scientific laboratory, was a notable feature. 98
developments such as the curriculum, 99 the length of a law
program, 100 faculty as full-time teachers and scholars, 101 and

Id. at 119-20. However, Hoeflich also notes that deductive nature of Langdell’s
paradigm reveals how “Langdell’s notion of law as a rational science, therefore,
was anything but unique or innovative. Indeed, to a very large extent, the
Langdellian concept of legal science simply echoed Mayes, Legaré, Stewart,
Leibniz, and other earlier jurists.” Id. at 120.
97 C.C. Langdell, A SELECTION OF CASES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS WITH
REFERENCES AND CITATIONS vi (1871).
98 Beatrice A. Tice, The Academic Law Library in the 21st Century: Still the
Heart of the Law School, 1 UC Irvine L. Rev. 159, 164–65 (2011).
99 Friedman, supra note ___, at 471-72.
100 Id. at 466.
101 Id.
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faculty scholarship 102 all reflected this rational and empirical
scientific conception.
An illustrative way of unpacking the Langdellian ideal of
law as science in his case method is to explore the meaning and
significance of its most defining heuristic: “thinking like a
lawyer.” Although the origins of this phrase is unclear, “thinking
like a lawyer” has characteristically tethered itself as the moniker
that American law schools do in training lawyers, and thus
serving nearly as an imprimatur of the Langdellian case
method. 103 Indeed, to some certain extent, this purpose of the
Langdellian law school exemplified his rationalist assumptions
about the law; if the law is science, then the primary concern of a
legal education would be to develop the legal mind—and
“thinking” would extenuate that. 104 Over the years, the phrase,
“thinking like a lawyer,” has weathered both praise and criticism,
and yielded both patina and tarnish. Standing from a twentyfirst century vantage point, the phrase in this crisis time appears
more tarnished than gilded. Yet, a simple exegetical close-read of
the phrase itself helps us understand the Langdellian formalism
for law and pedagogy that the phrase invokes.
First, “thinking like a lawyer,” reveals a scientific
conception of law in how its form appeals to the scientific inquiry
of the nineteenth century. Alternative pedagogical conceptions of
law teaching could have been “arguing like a lawyer”—which
would have emphasized rhetoric or even the concept of “law as
rhetoric.” It could have also been “practicing like a lawyer”—
which would have invariably conceived of “law as process,” or
(gasp) “law as a trade,” bringing out excessive anxiety in Langdell
and many of his Brahmin peers. 105 Here, however, the act of
“thinking” is singled out as the sole thing that law schools must
instill, displacing all other functions and engagements between a
See Kimball, supra __, at 283.
Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like A Lawyer:
Analyzing the Cognitive Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 Campbell L.
Rev. 413, 419 (2007).
104 Id.
105 Eric Shimamoto, Comment, To Take Arms Against A See of Trouble:
Legal Citation and the Reassertion of Hierarchy, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 443, 448
(2004).
102
103
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lawyer and the law.
This isolation of “thinking” is both
significant and deliberate. “Thinking,” on one hand, could have
been set up here to ignore all other things that a practicing
lawyer would do; and conversely, it could also empirically
represent all the things within a Langdellian sensibility that a
practicing lawyer does—after all one reading of Langdell’s notion
for “mastering” the “certain doctrines or principles” of law as
science is that any mastery begins categorically with thinking
about the law. 106 Either way, the phrase “thinking like a lawyer”
elevates mind over action and underscores that the pedagogical
crux in Langdell’s case method is a type of inquiry or mental
perspective that Langdell would have considered “lawyerly.”
If the law is a science, then this type of inquiry would
appear to be rigorous, but also lofty, and perhaps even abstract at
times. It would not be menial or banal, but instead exists as a
worthy type of thinking that, like the sciences and empiricism,
deserved a place at the university. The use of “thinking” in
“thinking like a lawyer” perhaps reflected the push for
prominence of lawyers in the post-antebellum America of the
nineteenth century. 107 Indeed, that is the perception that the
case method, as it was classically used in law school lecture halls,
attempts to convey as it purports to make law students “think
like lawyers.” As the examination of appellate opinions proceeds,
the Socratic dialogue between the professor and students about
those case opinions attempts to approximate what scientists
would do. 108 Regardless of whether that is truly what scientists
do or not, the heart of that “thinking” or inquiry in the law course
is inductive. The examination of a closed universe of cases
typically assumes, in case method fashion, a method of discovery
that helps to enlighten upon certain legal principles to be used to
predict future outcomes of disputes. 109 This is typically where the
inductive reasoning takes place. To glance even more narrowly
Langdell, supra note ___, at vi.
Bruce A. Kimball, THE TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 107-08 (1995) (describing the law profession’s rise to prominence after
the American Civil War).
108 Jeffrey D. Jackson, Socrates and Langdell in Legal Writing: Is the
Socratic Method A Proper Tool for Legal Writing Courses?, 43 Cal. W. L. Rev.
267, 270 (2007).
109 Stevens, supra note ___, at 53.
106
107
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into that inductive reasoning, the case method prompts students
to render or intuit the results of cases by deciding categorically
how similar they are to previous cases or how distinct they are. 110
Moreover, there is rational, left-brain logic in the endeavor, which
adds to the abstraction. Although the facts of cases might vary
from dispute to dispute, one assumes under Langdellian concept
of law that the legal principles that guide the direction of cases
are discoverable and unwavering and just. Put in such terms, at
times, there is a dispassionate feel to this inductive reasoning—
not unlike “higher mathematics,” according to Lawrence
Friedman. 111 All in all, the “thinking” in “thinking like a lawyer,”
as the case method’s use of the Socratic dialogue demonstrates,
conveys the impression of a hermetic scientific method that
discounts experimentation and experience as part of the scientific
engagement, but one that favors studying legal concepts isolated
in abstraction or a vacuum. 112 This emphasizes the case method
differentiated itself from the “text-book method” of law school
instruction that was the fashion in American law schools prior to
Langdell’s ascendancy at Harvard in the 1870s. 113
Another way that the phrase “thinking like a lawyer”
reflects the case method pedagogy is in the way that the phrase
case can conjure the concept of law as Langdell and the formalists
envisioned. The phrase reveals its Langdellian conception of
legal science if one asks just exactly what that lawyer was
supposed to “think” about at the inception of the case method at
Harvard. The discovery of isolated legal concepts in Langdell’s
inductive case method presumes that the inquiry leads to a
complete and organic version of the common law, devoid of
contextual variables; again, this impression exemplifies
Langdell’s conception of law as science, a science that stems from
universal principles evolved through time. 114 But the way
Langdell considered the law as science and the way his described
it harbored inconsistencies on the surface. First, he treated the
West, supra note __, at 50.
Friedman, supra note ___, at 472.
112 Id. at 472.
113 See id. at 466.
114 See id. at 473 (“The unity of the some parts of the common law was a
fact. Langdell’s abstractions, however, ignored the nature of law as a living
system, rooted in time, place, and circumstance.”)
110
111
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law as if it was not evolving—that by sifting and culling through
cases like sediment, a universal truth of the law could be
scientifically and archeologically uncovered. 115 However, he also
described how such common-law principles had evolved over time,
for instance, in the way he organized cases chronologically in his
contracts casebook to show a development. Perhaps in this culling
between good and bad cases, the more lawyers of thought about
principles over the centuries, the more we arrived at the truth of
these legal principles. Or perhaps the law never evolved; under a
Langdellian, formalist sensibility, the law was always “there” in
the natural world of cases, pre-dating humans in some mystical
organic form, and merely waiting to be found for our judicial
benefit—or quite possibly the inconsistencies reveal some human
sleight of hand. Moreover, not only does this idea of the
completeness of the law seem stagnant, if, in whatever way, the
law has really ceased to evolve; but also in the ritualized
dogmatic practice of the case method, it would add an autopsy feel
to the whole study of case law. To Langdell, however, the
completeness of the law did not indicate stagnancy; but rather the
presumption and belief that law was complete signaled its
autonomy. 116 To Langdell, his observed scientific disposition of
law suggested that law existed in nature apart from man, to be
discovered, to be studied, but not to be augmented. Thus, it is
tempting to make the metaphoric analogy that Langdell’s case
method was like the attempt to find a natural resource, and once
found, its application to existing and future legal problems was
unadulterated. In describing the importance of the law library,
Langdell’s own words seem to allude to this: “We have also
constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the proper
workshop of professors and students alike; that it is to us all that
the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and
physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the
botanical garden to the botanists.” 117 The law library was the

Id. at 472.
Rob Atkinson, Law As A Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission
Field of the Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 621, 627 (2001).
117 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 Law
Q. Rev. 123, 124 (1887).
115
116
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laboratory and to find the law, we would go to its printed
books. 118 So there, law was a science.
An important hidden assumption of Langdell’s conception
of the law was its perceived perfection. Buttressed by thencurrent values of objectivity and empiricism in the sciences,
Langdell conceived of the law as “objective” and perfect as well.
Of course, in this way, like the sciences, law deserved a place for
true academic prestige and study at the university, away from the
connotations of previous incarnations of American law schools
that emphasized rote-memory and daily recitations on the law.
The features of the Langdellian casebook exemplify this peculiar
conception of law as this unique academic science. The original
casebooks assembled and used at Harvard during Langdell’s
tenure were merely a collection of cases, without notes, and
devoid of social or political contexts. 119 The cases reflected the
English common law tradition; for instance, most of the cases in
Langdell’s contracts casebook were English cases while American
cases were fewer and mostly from New York and Massachusetts
courts. 120 Of course, questions of true objectivity would arise to
challenge Langdell’s assumptions in the canonical assembling of
these cases for instruction, if they were to exemplify the perfect
unity of the common law. But for Langdell, the dogma of the
common law would allow him to ignore that point; after all, even
in the preface of his casebook, he defended his selection of cases
by pointing to “good” and “bad” cases:
[T]he cases which are useful and necessary for this
purpose [of study] at the present day bear an
exceedingly small proportion to all that have been
reported. The vast majority are useless, and worse
than useless, for any purpose of systematic study.
Moreover the number of fundamental legal doctrines
is much less than is commonly supposed; the many
different guises in which the same doctrine is
constantly making its appearance, and the great
extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of
See id.
Friedman, supra note __, at 482.
120 Id. at 469.
118
119
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There is an almost Darwinian survival-of-the-fittest feeling
here—as Langdell described the process of collecting these
artifact cases in his book. 122 And it was Darwin’s scientific theory
that promoted a sense of objectivity. 123 Like species being guided
by an invisible hand toward survival in evolutionary biology, the
“fittest” cases and legal principles survived in Langdell’s world of
legal science to be refined by thinking academically about
them. 124 Other than the inclusion of good cases and the exclusion
of bad ones, the process of finding such good cases in Langdell’s
contracts casebook were divided and arranged topically, with
cases in each topic presented in chronology, “showing an evolution
of principles from darkness to light.” 125 Moreover, no statutes
were included in his casebook. 126 With the casebook, students
were to distill or find the legal principles contained in such cases
and believe that such principles were fixed and able to resolve
future cases. Thus, the form of the Langdellian casebook was
mimetic of Langdell’s creed about the common law as science.
The casebook was both self-contained and empirical in
presentation, hermetic unto itself and steeped strictly in a nearexegetical tradition of the common law. 127 All of these features of
an untouchable perfection were the envisioned law to be “thought
about” in “thinking like a lawyer.”
The more one examines the Langdellian case method in
this partially destabilized and critical fashion, the more apparent
that Langdell’s conception of “law as science” had some of the
spirit of what law is—especially as embodied within the English
Langdell, supra note __, at vi.
See Stevens, surpa note __, at 55 (describing that the case method “was
‘scientific,’ practical, and somewhat Darwinian” and that “it managed to create
an aura of the survival of the fittest”).
123 Id.
124 Accord Marcia Speziale, Langdell’s Concept of Law as Science: The
Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 29
(1980) (Langdell’s conceptions “parallel nineteenth-century empiricist and
evolutionist thinking”).
125 Friedman, supra note ___, at 469.
126 Id.
127 Id at 482.
121
122
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common law tradition of law—but the conception at times was
also heavily and ironically artificial. The exclusion of certain
cases in his teachings, cases of “local diversity” for instance, over
English “canonical” cases was motivated by aspirations of
elevating legal studies as a unitary science across the United
States. 128 Accordingly, in assuming authority by presiding over
the pedagogy and teaching methodology at Harvard in the 1870s,
Langdell was able to elevate himself and his formalist conception;
in Lawrence Friedman’s words “[t]here was only one common law;
Langdell was its prophet. . . . Oceans could not sever the unity of
common law; it was one and indivisible . . . .” 129 First was the
sense of intellectual hierarchy that perpetuated itself; the
common law was elevated and Langdell along with it. 130 Others
have elaborated more functionally about Langdell’s sleight of
hand, describing the results of situating himself at the head of
this brand of formalism: “Landgell, the interpreter of the law,
never let the reader know that it was he, rather than the ‘law,’
that created the discourse and conducted the analysis.” 131
Langdell’s conception reinforced a way to speak about the law
that was detached from the subject in its formalism. Rather,
perceiving law as science led to viewing and dissecting law in
assumptions of completeness and in isolating abstraction. As a
result, this formalist way of viewing the law bears a “hidden
assumption of the autonomous legal subject,” which is
theoretically problematic. 132 Langdell’s formalism “proceeded as
if law itself was speaking to the reader and hence capable of
creating its own meaning: ‘The law, like a subject, did things;
doctrines became subjects, and did things to each other.’ ” 133 That
view was what law’s complete autonomy implied and was created
by “the objectification of law” where “legal rules are explained,
analyzed, and criticized as if they were transcendental objects

Id. at 472.
Id.
130 Id.
131 Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From
Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 Ind. L. Rev. 353, 381 (citing
Pierre Schlag The Problem with the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1721 (1991)).
132 Id. at 381-82.
133 Id. at 381 (quoting David S. Caudill, Pierre Schlag’s “The Problem with
the Subject”: Law’s Need for an Analyst, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 707, 711 (1993)).
128
129
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unaffected by analyzing subjects.” 134 In both method and content,
Langdell’s “law as science” fetishized ways to view the law in
perfected form and ignored “inconsistences” for an idealized
perfection cast as scientific objectivity—even though it could not
have been truly objective or scientific if one had to discover the
law by looking selectively backward in time in “printed books.” 135
Moreover, Langdell’s “law as science” was a science that ignored
experimentation and context. 136 It left the lawyer as an observer,
detached from law’s evolution because the common law was no
longer assumed to be evolving. Accordingly, law was to be
written about “in the passive voice” and to be “rigorously
maintain[ed in] the detached demeanor of a scientist conducting a
controlled experiment.” 137 No subject existed, apart from the law
itself, in the legal principles drawn from the opinions that
Langdell and his students examined in Harvard law courses—
despite these opinion’s judicial authorships. Langdell’s own
theory of the law—his own peculiar science—and methodology
reveals that he was more or less an exegete. 138 The law was
perfect—or perfected in abstraction—and as a lawyer, one could
only think within the restrictions of that perfection, not beyond.
That was the dogma of the Langdell’s legal science. His
conception of law was taught and perpetuated through its case
method dissection of common law cases to students at Harvard
and then nationally thereafter; after World War I, the emergence
of numerous American law schools replicated the case method as
American legal education’s conspicuous pedagogy in lecture halls
throughout the United States. 139 Accordingly, generations of
Id. (using Langdell’s contract case book as an example).
Accord Wai Chee Dimock, Rules of Law, Laws of Science, 13 Yale J.L. &
Human. 203, 209-10 (2001). (“Langdell’s scientific knowledge seems to have
been quite perfunctory, oblivious not only to the historical challenge of science
but also to the new developments taking place in the very century in which he
was writing.”).
136 Minda, supra note __, at 381.
137 Id. at 380.
138 Kunal M. Parker, Representing Interdisciplinarity, 60 Vill. L. Rev. 561,
563 (2015).
139 Stephen R. Alton, Roll over Langdell, Tell Llewellyn the News: A Brief
History of American Legal Education, 35 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 339, 349-50
(2010).
134
135
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American law students have “thought like lawyers” and
objectified the law under Langdell’s conception of legal science.
B. The Neglect of Realism
While the widespread use of the Langdellian case method
was solidifying in American law schools in the 1920s and 1930s,
legal realism came to dominate American legal thought. 140 An
earlier version of realism had co-existed with the Langdellian
formalists during the late nineteenth century, with Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., as one of its inspirational founding
patriarchs. 141 Holmes, who taught at Langdell’s Harvard during
the 1870s, withheld the beliefs of formalism and did not share
Langdell’s concept that that common law was unified and
complete. 142
Rather, Holmes’ concept of the common law
embraced a “pragamatic historicism,” which relied on “experience
as an objective source of knowledge.” 143 History has paired
Langdell and Holmes against each other, but the rise of their
respective schools of legal thought was not simultaneous. As
Stephen Feldman has described, the realists followed the
formalists in the period of legal modernism in American law, with
Holmes’ ideas joined subsequently by the writings of Roscoe
Pound and Benjamin Cardozo and even later by the likes of
Jerome Frank, Felix Cohen, and Karl Llewellyn. 144
The realists assailed against Langdell’s formalist
conception of law as science. Pound famously called Langdell’s
formalism “mechanical jurisprudence.” 145 On the whole, the
realists “denounced the abstract and decontextualized
rationalism of Langdellian legal science as unrelated to
meaningful social reality, unrelated to human experiences of the
external world.” 146 They pointed out the fallacy of Langdell’s
scientific objectivity: “Whereas Langdellian scholars claimed that
Stephen M. Feldman, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM
AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 108-09 (2000).
141 See Kimball, supra note __, at 304-05.
142 Feldman, supra note __, at 108.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 108-10.
145 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605 (1908).
146 Feldman, supra note __, at 110.
140
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their abstract reasoning enabled them to discover objective legal
truths—the rules and principles of the common law—realists
such as Felix Cohen belittled the Langdellian rules and principles
as ‘transcendental nonsense.’ ” 147 The realist movement took
dominance of the high seas of American legal thought away from
the Langdellian formalists, but from within the movement itself,
there was a spectrum of disparity amongst its prominent
thinkers. 148 Still, the realist reaction against the Langdellian
notion of unity and objectivity of law as science was
undeniable. 149 Ultimately, what the realists offered as a response
to Langdellian formalism was to “cause the predicative value of
doctrine to be seriously questioned.” 150 They questioned and
torpedoed Langdell’s objectivity until that objectivity was
substantially submerged. 151
The realists did not exempt Langdellian innovations of the
American law school from scrutiny. 152 Jerome Frank famously
made his views known that “[t]he law student, should learn while
Id. at 110-111. Feldman uses an example from Felix Cohen to further
elaborate the realist philosophical differences:
147

For instance, to determine whether a court has jurisdiction
over a corporation, a Langdellian would ask, “Where is the
corporation?” The Langdellian then ostensibly would turn to
abstract rules and principles to resolve this question—
concluding, let’s say, that the corporation is in New York. But
Cohen argued that despite the Langdellians’ pretensions, their
rules and principles would not produce a determinative
outcome in this case. “Clearly the question of where a
coprortion is, when it incorportates in one state and has agents
transacting corportate business in another is not a question
that can be answered by empirical observation,” Cohen wrote,
“It is in fact, a question identical in metaphysical status with
the question . . . “How many angels can stand on a point of a
needle?”
Id. at 111 (quoting Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935), in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 33, 34-37
(1960)).
148 Stevens, supra note __, at 156.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 Id.
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in school, the art of legal practice. And to that end, the law
schools should boldly, not slyly and evasively, repudiate the false
dogmas of Langdell.” 153 In a more hypothesized tone, Karl
Llewellyn later expressed his views about the Langdellian
dependence on appellate cases by contrasting it with the case
approach used in business schools: “Consider, for example, the
possibility of building up our so-called cases out beyond the
judicial opinion into something resembling the completeness of
the cases gathered for the Harvard Business School.” 154 In their
own respective right, Frank and Llewellyn as realists, both
beckoned for the kind of practical training for lawyers that
steered beyond Langdell’s case method. 155 Yet, the questioning
fell short of leading to deep and comprehensive changes in
existing Langdellian legal pedagogy: “The criticism of the case
method came under fire in the 1920s and 1930s from legal
scholars of the Legal Realist movement, even while it continued
as part of American law school training.” 156 There was, of course,
some noticeable modifications: the inclusion of clinical legal
education and the contextualization of social sciences into the law
school
curriculum
with
new
courses
that
were
157
interdisciplinary.
But heavy dependence on appellate opinions
in law school classes persisted. The Socratic dialogue continued
to be employed in lectures. In spite of adding supporting
materials alongside cases in the law casebook, 158 the core of the
text was still comprised of topical collections of appellate case
opinions. Accordingly, “[d]espite the realist critique, the use of
the case method as a pedagogical tool for developing exacting
analyses of a legal problem continued to be used throughout the

Jerome Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J.
723, 726 (1933).
154 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. Legal
Educ. 211, 215 (1949).
155 See Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on
Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 577, 587-89 (1987).
156 Susan Katcher, Legal Training in the United States: A Brief History, 24
Wis. Int’l L.J. 335 (2006).
157 See Stevens, supra note __, at 158-60.
158 Grant Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (1977).
153
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twentieth century
instruction.” 159

and

remains

a

part

of

law

school

Some irony exists in this neglect, particularly when one
notes how the realists dominated over the American legal
academy in the early decades of the twentieth century. One
would have believed that the realists’ disagreement with Langdell
would have prompted some significant changes to Langdell’s case
method pedagogy in American law teaching. But at the core of
realism, if the law was not Langdell’s Darwinian notion of science
any longer, the law had become a social science. Perhaps this
transition was why—even when other movements of legal
thought emerged such as legal process in the 1950s, 160 and then
in the 1970s and thereafter, schools such as law and economics,
critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature,
and critical race theory—law schools continued to use the case
method long after the age of American legal realism. 161
With the realists, law was not science, but social science. 162
This conception embedded itself in the case method pedagogy,
creating a neat retrofit to Langdell’s case method rather than a
wholesale move to another entirely new instructional practice;
according to Friedman, “Langdell’s system was repackaged as a
superior kind of skills training; . . . the method taught the student
how to ‘think like a lawyer.’ This meant mastering the law school
brand of mental acrobatics, along with the fine art of
argument.” 163 Perhaps this lack of change reflects the limitation
of realist conceptions of law from being totally and completely
different from formalism. In any event, as a result of this retrofit,
the objectification of law that had underscored the practice of
Langdell’s case method remained in some shape in later case
method usage in law schools. Even past the last century, whether
advertently or not, professors have instilled that objectification to
Katcher, supra note __, at 368 (citing I THE HISTORY OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY SOURCES 24
(Steve Sheppard ed., 1999).
160 Feldman, supra note __, at 120 (describing the rise of the legal process
school in the 1950s) .
161 See Minda, supra note ___, at 367.
162 See Alton, supra note ___, at 356.
163 Lawrence M. Friedman, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 36 (2002).
159
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students in their law classes, even though legal theorists no
longer subscribe to Langdellian conceptions. 164 The form of the
case method, as used in American law schools today, replicates
the ceremony of objectification, even if law as science has been
replaced by something else. 165 The examination of law through
the indoctrinated rituals of professorial questioning-andanswering, the perceived primacy of appellate case decisions, and
the same line-up of subject courses in the first-year curriculum
since Langdell’s Harvard days suggest that, devoid of the
Langdellian scientific perspective of law, the remnant form of
Langdell’s methodology might still be steering students and
scholars toward a similar type of regard for the law. 166 And all of
this continuance of the case method has been the status quo for
decades. In terms of pedagogy then, what American law schools
have been sailing on since the legal realists is the ghost ship of
Langdell.
In an existential observation about American law schools
in the post-Recession crisis, Robin West has suggested the cause
and implications of the hesistancy to move beyond Langdell’s case
method, despite modern rejections of Langdell’s conception of law:
Contemporary law students are receiving the
benefit of a belated recognition that in his desire to
separate the study of law from the society of society
Langdell was spectacularly wrong: law is not
autonomous from other cultural, economic,
historical, and philosophical forces, and should not
be studied as such. Today’s law students are the
better for it; they have a more realistic, as well as far
richer, understanding of law as a consequence than
did their counterparts in Langdell’s classrooms.
Nevertheless, the added sophistication that comes
from interdisciplinarity does not in any obvious or
automatic way contribute to the articulation of what
a lawyer is or should be, or what education a student
Minda, supra note __, at 382-83.
Id.
166 West, supra note __, at 43-46 (noting law schools teach a “moral
relativism”).
164
165
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should have to become one. It does not, that is, fill
the gap left by our rejection of the Langdellian
understanding of the lawyer as a member of a
learned profession immersed in the study of the
common law. We simply have not articulated such a
post-Langdellian
conception,
and
all
the
interdisciplinary studies in the world on the nature
of law, rather than lawyering, will not imply one: we
will not have one, that is, until we have a faculty
committed to producing one, and acting on it. 167
West attributes the cause of this hesitancy to jump ship to some
other vessel of teaching to a lack of faculty perspective collectively
on the teaching of law students—a missing “post-Langdellian
conception” 168—and not an academic perspective of law’s nature,
which as West criticizes is what students receive from modern
law courses. 169 The implication of hanging on to the traditions
and practices of law teaching is how inappropriate or effective the
current conception is for training lawyers. 170 In other instances,
West has identified in her own words how the use of the case
method leads to problematic objectifications of law, illustrating
how the propagation of Langdell’s case method leads to legalism
that distracts from serious engagement with the idea that law can
further justice. 171 Her arguments on whether or not law ought to
further justice and how such notions should be taught to law
students buttresses her own specialized imperative that law
schools must move toward a post-Langdellian conception. 172
Nevertheless, she is correct to diagnose that a post-Langdellian
conception is amiss in legal education even though more than a
century of American legal history has passed since the decline of
Langdell’s concept of law as science.

Id. at 154-55.
See id.
169 Id. at155.
170 Id. at 154.
171 Id. at 51, 57-59.
172 Id. at 66.
167
168
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Others have concurred with West. 173 Part III will examine
more implications of this incongruity between American legal
pedagogy and history.
III.THE CASE METHOD & OBJECTIFICATION OF THE LAW
In observing the historical movements of American
jurisprudence, one need not search far and wide for criticisms
that the nature of the law is ever slow-moving in comparison to
advances in social reality. Such criticisms emerge rather easily
after a cursory search. Whether scholarly observations of lag and
sluggishness have been used to describe progress of certain bodies
of law 174 or the entirety of jurisprudence itself, 175 one consensus is
that “the legal system was peculiarly slow to reflect changes in
the larger culture, partly because of the specialized nature of the
legal profession and partly because of the investment of
professionals in the status quo.” 176
Similarly, as law’s
derivatives, the legal profession and legal education both embody
comparable rhythms toward progress. Like progress in law,
“[a]dmittedly, change often comes rather slowly to legal
education; after all, the law has always tended to be a backwardlooking profession.” 177
Resistance is more often the norm.
Conflated together, all of these remarks about the behavior of law
and lawyers prompts one to ask in the context of the legal
profession whether lawyers as pessimists tend to persist in
orthodoxy more than they would if they were more collectively
optimists. 178
At first, Langdell’s reforms at Harvard Law School were
not exempt from resisters. Early in his period of pedagogical
Alton, supra note __, at 363.
See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 Conn. L. Rev. 397, 418
(2015) (remarking how “[c]hange in property law is slow”).
175 See, e.g., Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 Pepp. L.
Rev. 41, 70 (2006).
176 G. Edmund White, Transforming History in the Postmodern Era, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 1315, 1323 n. 21 (1993) (referencing Lawrence M. Friedman &
Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 Colum.
L. Rev. 50 (1967)).
177 See Alton, supra note __, at 361.
178 Josef Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method in American
University Law Schools 13 (1914) ; see also White, supra note ___, 1323 n. 21.
173
174
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innovations at Harvard, the introduction and use of the case
method in the classroom met some staunch reluctance from both
legal educators and the bar alike. The account in Centennial
History of Harvard Law School, which attributed the case method
to Landgell, recounted that “to most of the students, as well as to
Langdell’s colleagues, [the case method] was an abomination.” 179
More specifically, “ ‘[h]is attempts were met with the open
hostility, if not of the other instructors, certainly of the bulk of the
students.
His first lectures were followed by impromptu
indignation meetings. — “What do we care whether Myers agrees
with the case, or what Fessenden thinks of the dissenting
opinion? What we want to know is: ‘What’s the law?’ ” ’ ” 180 The
contemporary bar had its harsh skepticisms: “Practitioners had
always had some doubts about the case method, both
intellectually and politically. As early as 1876 the Central Law
Journal had condemned the system ‘which we understand to
involve a wide and somewhat indiscriminating reading of cases—
some of them overruled.’ ” 181 The editors of the Central Law
Journal had expressly disclaimed any approval of the case
method. 182
They also noted how the rise of the case method
pedagogy had “excited great and bitter controversy” that led to
the establishment of the law school at Boston University.” 183 The
allusion to a certain underlying concern or fear for how the
profession might be perceived seemed to lurk beneath the surface
of the Journal’s observations:
The strength of our impressions is that the reading
of carefully selected judgments of the courts, could in
a course of study, profitably be made subsidiary to
the attending of lectures and the study of approved
textbooks; but we doubt the wisdom of the relying on
THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, 1817-1917 35
(Harvard Law School Ass’n ed., 1918).
180 Id.
181 Stevens, supra note __, at 57 (quoting The Higher Legal Education, 3
Cent. L. J. 540 (1876)).
182 The Higher Legal Education, supra note __, at 540 (“We do not wish to
be understood as approving the system of teaching law introduced by Prof.
Landell[.]”).
183 Id.; see also Friedman, supra note __, at 470 (“The Boston University
Law School was founded in 1872 as an alternative to Harvard’s insanity.”).
179
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case-reading to the extent to which, as
understand it, Prof. Langdell’s system goes. 184

we

This possible prediction that the law would be subjugated
resembles the tension against the trade night-school law schools
that sprang in the early 20th century to accommodate ethnic
minorities who wanted to attend law schools and enter into the
profession but were more or less excluded from the learned
classes at law schools such as Harvard.
It seemed more
politically motivated than accurate. In fact, the trade school
model was inconsistent with Langell’s intentions for starting the
use of the case method at Harvard; he had intended the case
method to elevate the legal studies, not automatize it.
True to effect, however, the journal editors got it right that
students would skip his classes. In the first term of introducing
the case method, Langdell’s “students were bewildered; they cut
Langdell’s classes in droves, only a few remained to hear him
out.” 185 By the end, the class was left to seven students—
devotees who were then known as “Kit’s Freshmen” or “Langdell’s
Freshman.” 186 But students had not left because they decided
they could “wing” the learning of critical lawyering skills on their
own. More likely Langdell’s students left because they could not
find the relevance of what Langdell taught through his case
method—“overruled” decisions. 187
Inadvertently or otherwise, Joseph Beale echoed this
irrelevancy when he recounted that Langdell’s law “sometimes
seemed too academic; and many of his students said, if they did
not really feel, that his teaching was magnificent, but was not
law” 188—particularly as Langdell called English cases by Lord
Hardwick “comparatively recent” and “was believed to regard
modern decisions as beneath his notice.” 189
The peculiar
academic nature of Langdell’s classroom teaching proved to be
The Higher Legal Education, supra note __, at 540.
Friedman, supra note __, at 470.
186 Id.
187 See id.
188 Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Professor Langdell—His Later Teaching Days, 20
Harv. L. Rev. 9, 10 (1906).
189 Id.
184
185
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pedantic: “The dialogues in Langdell’s classes went slowly, and
covered very little ground, compared to the lecture method.” 190
As an immediate reaction, colleagues at Harvard returned to
their previous methods of law teaching. 191
Of course, eventually, the case method became the status
quo that the legal academy heavily invested. 192 In 1906, James
Ames, dean of the Harvard Law School from 1895 to 1910, and
who has received some attribution regarding the popularizing of
the case method, remarked that “the most fruitful change of all
was the revolution effected by Langdell in the mode of teaching
and studying law,—a revolution now so complete that most
persons hear with surprise that, when his ‘Cases on Contracts,’
was first used, his disciples were a mere handful and known as
‘Landgell’s freshmen,’ a name given as a term of reproach but
received as a title of honor[.]” 193 Ames had been one of those
seven freshmen. 194 Perhaps this artifact was truly why Ames was
hyperbolic in sentiment when he paid Langdell his tributes in
1906, upon Langdell’s death, by saying that “[i]n the last ten
years [Landgell’s] method has conquered its way into a majority
of American law schools” 195 and that “it is a constant satisfaction
that his man of genius was permitted to see his views dominating
legal education throughout the United States.” 196 But in terms of
the case method, “the leading universities had ‘received the faith’
by 1891,” 197 and “[u]ltimately, every major and most minor law
schools converted to case-books and the Socratic method.” 198 In
large part, the method’s success was due to a gradual ability for
law schools aspiring for prominence in the university setting to
Friedman, supra note __, at 470.
Id.
192 James Barr Ames, Professor Langdell—His Services to Legal Education,
20 Harv. L. Rev. 12, 13 (1906).
193 Ames, supra note __, at 13.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.; see Kimball, Langdell Problem, supra note __, at 293-94 (discussing
the “revisionist” nature of the tributes to Langdell in 1906, following his death,
especially in contrast to Ames’ works as dean of Harvard that maintained
Langdell’s legacy).
197 Stevens, supra note __, at 57.
198 Friedman, supra note ___, at 471.
190
191

2017]

LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY

37

use it to reflect conformance to a growing elitist trend that had
started at Harvard. 199
To be sure, some have observed positive attributes and
consequences for using the case method. There were financial
benefits and efficiencies. As Robert Stevens has observed, “[t]he
vast success of Langdell’s method enabled the establishment of a
large-size class.” 200 Specifically, under Langdell’s deanship at
Harvard, the case method allowed a class of 75 students to be led
by one faculty member: “Its Socratic aspect justified the
abandonment of the recitation and the quiz, the ‘exercises’ used at
good schools relying on the lecture method.” 201 The economics
established by this new faculty-student ratio meant less
expensive courses to run at Harvard; indeed, “[a]ny educational
program or innovation that allowed one man to teach even more
students was not unwelcome to university administrators. The
‘Harvard method of instruction’ meant that law schools could be
self-supporting.” 202 This self-substance seemed attractive to law
schools.
In terms of pedagogical benefits, others have identified
them in the case method as well. Approached by the Carnegie
Foundation in 1913 to evaluate the case method in American law
schools, German law professor, Josef Redlich, 203 wrote in his
resulting report that the case method was more analytically
demanding for the law student over the older textbook method:
Consequently as the [case method] was developed, it
laid the main emphasis precisely upon that aspect of
the training which the older text-book school entirely
neglected: the training of the student in intellectual
independence, in individual thinking, in digging out
the principles through penetrating analysis of the
material found within separate cases: material
which contains, all mixed in with one another, both
the facts, as life creates them, which generate the
Stevens, supra note ___, at 63.
Id. at 63.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Kimball, Langdell Problem, supra note __, at 290.
199
200
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law, and at the same time rules of the law itself,
component parts of the general system. In the fact
that, as has been said before, it has actually
accomplished this purpose, lies the great success of
the case method. 204
Redlich also qualified his praise by noting his hesitancy with the
case method’s embodiments of a scientific conception of law,
calling the heavy analogy between law and science
“inaccurate” 205—and by regarding the nature of American law, as
driven by common law practices, to have buoyed the case
method’s success. 206
On similar evaluations of praise as Redlich, others have
dived further into observations of the case method’s analytical
demand. Paul Carrington offered a catalogue of benefits that
observed the case method’s capability to foster mental discipline
and independent habits of learning the law, 207 its development of
lawyerly judgment, 208 its helpful comprehension of common law
traditions, 209 its promotion of moral consciousness, 210 and its
narrative power to draw attention. 211 In commenting about
Carrington’s indicated list of benefits, Judith Welch Wegner has
questioned “whether these benefits are directly attributable to the
‘case method’ or to the use of the ‘Socratic method’ of questioning
in conjunction with the study of cases, as discussed below.” 212
Regardless of this distinction, Welch then considered that to
Carrington’s list
other benefits might be added: the potential for
development of ‘deep knowledge,’ the chance to
participate in the ‘construction’ of knowledge that
Redlich, supra note ___, at 39.
Id. at 55.
206 Id. at 35.
207 Paul Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 691, 745-46
(1995).
208 Id. at 747.
209 Id. at 749-54.
210 Id. at 754-59.
211 Id. at 846.
212 Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked Problems,”
61 Rutgers L. Rev. 867, 927 (2009).
204
205
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fosters memory and self-confidence, the opportunity
to teach about the legal process and lawyering as
well as about how to read cases and engage in
critical analysis, the power of learning in an
authentic context that resembles at least to some
degree the actual practice setting, and the
educational force of gaining certainty in the face of
pre-existing doubt. 213
In likewise fashion, Russell Weaver has also noted how the heavy
emphasis of cases factually contextualizes the legal situations for
students and “stimulate greater student interest” than reading
summaries of legal issues from a textbook. 214 Similarly to
Carrington, Weaver also noted how the case method teaches
students how to dissect the different parts of a case opinion, 215
facilitates learning of critical analysis by compelling in-class
inquiry into cases, 216 develops mental “toughness” and quick
thinking skills, 217 allows learning law in a precedent-driven
system, 218 imparts comprehension of a legal process that is
inductive, 219 and instructs upon the functions of a lawyer. 220
Others have echoed Carrington, Welch, and Weaver’s emphases
that the case method promotes critical and intellectual rigor. 221
Of course, opposing views about the method also exist—and
in plenty form. Specific criticisms, particularly from law faculty,
over the pedagogical side effects of Langdell’s case method have
always persisted—criticisms that echo the contemporary scrutiny
of the method during Langdell’s days at Harvard, but also ones
that dip deeper into its murky waters to uncover more of its
shortcomings and treachery.
Never mind Jerome Frank’s
unflattering criticisms about the case method in the 1930s, which
Id. at 927.
Weaver, supra note ___, at 547-48.
215 Id. at 549.
216 Id. at 549-52.
217 Id. at 553-53.
218 Id. at 553.
219 Id. at 553-57.
220 Id. at 557-561.
221 See Garner, supra note ___, at 328-29 (asserting that the case method
makes students self-sufficient and teaches about the law’s complexity).
213
214
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asserted inter alia, that under the case method, students “do not
study cases” truly as the method had claimed, 222 that [s]tudents
trained under the Langdell system are like future horticulturists
confining their studies to cut flowers,” 223 and that the method’s
most profound “fault is in its naïve assumption of the inviolability
of the stare decisis doctrine and its corollaries.” 224 Or one could
forgo for now, Grant Gilmore’s later acerbic indictments in the
1970s, noting that “[a]t least in Langdell’s version, [the case
method] had nothing whatever to do with getting students to
think for themselves; it was, on the contrary, a method of
indoctrination through brainwashing.” 225 In tone, both Frank
and Gilmore’s twentieth-century remarks seemed to rail against
the widespread acceptance of the case method, trying to arouse
mutiny in the academy by flinging contempt for Langdell and his
method into the air. And according to John Schlegel’s passing
quip, uncovered in Bruce Kimball’s relatively recent
historiography on Christopher Langdell, Grant Gilmore might
have succeeded. 226 But aside from Frank, Gilmore, and the
trashing of the Langdellian method for the sake of mutiny (or
even just the sake of trashing it), the crux of some of the negative
insights toward the Langdellian case method points to its
categorical failing to teach law in its entirety—that the pedagogy
is propped with the purpose to accomplish too much, and as a
result, has assumed too much. 227 Redlich alluded to this problem
when he wrote that a result of the case method as the dominant
way of teaching law in American law schools is that “the students
never obtain a general picture of the law as a whole, not even a
picture which includes only its main features.” 228 The teaching of
principles and doctrines under common law through the case
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev.
907, 910 (1933).
223 Id. at 912
224 Id. It could be worse: “They resemble prospective dog breeders who
never see anything but stuffed dogs.” Id.
225 Gilmore, DEATH OF CONTRACT, supra note __, at 14-15.
226 Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions,
Which They Are Not to Take As Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching
in the Classrooms of the Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 Law & Hist. Rev.
57, 60 (1999).
227 W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 84
(1997).
228 Redlich, supra note ___, at 41.
222
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method was “being most excellently performed” at the law schools
that Redlich observed but that did not mean, in his opinion, that
instruction on other traditions and points of the law were being
accomplished. 229 Grant Gilmore, aside from tone, made a similar
statement that the case method’s effect was a type of suppression
of the actual state and history of the law:
Since 1800 the principal characteristics of American
law had been its chaotic diversity, its sensitivity to
changing conditions, its fluidity, its pluralism. All
that had to be suppressed. . . . It is also fair to say
that the Langdellians, both in their casebooks and
their treatises, performed major surgery on what
their chosen English cases had been about when
they were real cases in a real England. England
became our never-never land, our Shangri-Law, our
Utopia. 230
Law was a distortion and the method reflected this distortion—a
method that was then used to teach law in American law schools.
Therein the ironies of a presumed completeness, unity, and
autonomy in a method with shortcomings emerge.
Three decades ago, Duncan Kennedy explored the social
and political ramifications of that distortion on American law
In his memorable crit-laden fashion, Kennedy
students. 231
claimed how law school itself as an ideology, a sentiment that
implies his views on the distortion of law, which made clearer
sense when he unpacked the consequences of seeing that ideology
for what it was:
To say that law school is ideological is to say that
what teachers teach along with basic skills is wrong,
is nonsense about what law is and how it works; that
the message about the nature of legal competence,
and its distribution among students is wrong, is
Id. at 43.
Gilmore, AGES OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note __, at 48.
231 See generally Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54-75 (3rd ed. David Kairys)
(1998).
229
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nonsense; that the ideas about the possibilities of life
as a lawyer that students pick up from legal
education are wrong, are nonsense. 232
Seemingly echoing Gilmore’s claim of “indoctrination by
brainwashing” but going even deeper, Kennedy illustrated how
the distortion had been embedded as the status quo of American
law schools and its ensuing effects on law students:
Because students believe what they are told,
explicitly and implicitly, about the world they are
entering, they behave in ways that fulfill the
prophecies the system makes about them and about
that world. This is the linkback that completes the
system: students do more than accept the way things
are, and ideology does more than damp opposition. 233
Kennedy’s reflections on the distortion of law were just as
scathing as Gilmore’s; for instance, the Socratic dialogue was
characterized as “pseudoparticipation.” 234
But his lengthier
ruminations drew out more clearly than Gilmore the distortion’s
profound potency and harm. From an examination of what takes
place in the typical Socratic dialogue, “[i]t quickly emerges that
neither the students nor the faculty are as homogeneous as they
at first appeared.” 235 That striation, undemocratic at its core in
Kennedy’s description, appears as ominous and tense as those
moments in a horror flick when recent converts to a destructive
cult recognizes that they’ve been had—and not in a good way.
But in Kennedy’s version, the converts continue to perpetuate the
hierarchy; they continue the path of becoming lawyers, up the
ranks of profession to eventually steer the industry and field.
Simultaneously, Kennedy criticized the case method for
falsifying both the intellectualism of the law and the practice of
lawyering. As for how the case method presented intellectualism
of the law, Kennedy found it to be underwhelming: “The actual
intellectual content of the law seems to consist of learning rules—
Id. at 54.
Id.
234 Id. at 56.
235 Id.
232
233
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what they are and why they have to be the way they are—while
rooting for the occasional judge who seems willing to make them
marginally more humane.” 236 Was that all there was to the law—
just these rules, likely from cases, and some hope for a meager
judicial morality? Kennedy’s reference to Langdell’s inductive
legal science here is glaring. Yet, the case method distorts more
than that—particularly in regards to lawyering. Skills are taught
under the case method, but taught in a twisted “mystified” way
that obscures what skills and lawyering are. Like others before
him, Kennedy contended that the case method substituted
notions of lawyering wholesale with the false primacy of inductive
legal reasoning by noting how under the case method, “law
emerges from a rigorous analytical procedure called legal
reasoning” 237—one which is “unintelligible to the layperson but
somehow both explains and validates the great majority of the
rules in force in our system.” 238 His remark here connected the
proverbial “thinking like a lawyer” (legal reasoning) with the idea
of law’s completion (Langdell’s formalism), and served up an
underhanded swipe at the case method’s inductive reasoning.
Then he attacked the content of law courses. Specifically, he
noted how the law courses segregated each legal doctrine issue “a
tub on its own bottom” misled students from learning “an
integrating vision of what law is, how it works, or how it might be
changed (other than in any incremental, case-by-case, reformist
way).” 239 That isolation parallels the isolation between legal
reasoning and lawyering that Kennedy found was what law
schools perpetrated, again distorting what law and lawyering
was: “ ‘Legal reasoning’ is sharply distinguished from law
practice, and one learns nothing about practice.” 240
The
consequence ultimately “disables” students from the profession. 241
The curricular holdovers from Langdell also perturbed
Kennedy. Recapitulating on the “tubs on their own bottoms”
motif, Kennedy criticized the segregation of law courses,
particularly in the first-year curriculum, as a deliberate,
Id. at 57.
Id. at 59.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 60.
241 Id.
236
237
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intentional set of separations 242 that distorted the reality of
law. 243 He observed that peripheral subjects, such as philosophy
of law, history of law, legal process, and law clinical courses, that
give context to the law were not readily taught as part of the core
curriculum because law schools, preferring inductive reasoning,
perceived these other courses as not promoting the “ ‘hard’
objective, serious, rigorous analytic core of law.” 244 Instead, law
schools trivialized these contextual courses as more or less
cosmetic, part of the “finishing school for learning the social art of
self-presentation as a lawyer.” 245 In this respect, Kennedy here
seemed to echo Redlich’s hesitancy more than a half-century
earlier in regards to the case method’s heavy emphasis of
analytical rigor over teaching the context of law—except unlike
Redlich, who was a German outside observer hired by the
Carnegie Foundation, Kennedy was observing as an insider, from
within the American legal academy (Harvard, no less), long after
Langdell’s case method had become the status quo.
Kennedy lamented for an alternative: “A more rational
system would emphasize to way to learn law rather than rules,
and skills rather than answers. Student capacities would be
more equal as a result, but students would also be radically more
flexible in what they could do in practice.” 246 He hinted at how
the distortion of law through the case method achieved disparity
in the way the Langdellian set-up in law schools created a setting
for “enforced cultural uniformity.” 247 If the analytical, inductive
rigor of “thinking like a lawyer” has been the categorical
substitute or proxy for what the law was or what lawyers did—or
at least how law schools have used it since Langdell—and if the
reason for inductive reasoning relied on Langdell’s original beliefs
in the completeness, unity, and autonomy of the common law,
then the idea of what was law and how to uncover and study it
under the case method was like what Redlich had said,
Id. at 61.
Id. (“Entering students just don’t know enough to figure out where the
teacher is fudging, misrepresenting, or otherwise distorting legal thinking and
legal reality.”)
244 Id. at 60.
245 Id. at 61.
246 Id. at 65.
247 Id. at 69.
242
243
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“inaccurate.” A more “realistic” idea of law has been siphoned off
only to be reflected by a peculiarly small and limited set of
behaviors that served to reinforce a distorted idea of the norm.
The cultural implications were significant here as Kennedy
illustrated how that small set of behaviors end up fetishized at
the top of a hierarchy that appeared oppressive, especially to
diverse law students. 248
What the case method did with its
distortion of law was to develop in law students “skills that
incapacitate rather than empower, skills that will help you
imprison yourself in practice.” 249 The minority law student
learned that the skill of assimilation was the oar of survival. 250
Meanwhile, everyone who entered the system “accept[ed] the
system’s presentation of itself as largely neutral, as apolitical,
meritocratic, instrumental, a matter of craft,” even though the
reality of law was not that way. 251 Not only was the outcome a
grim one for legal education as the pedagogy installed as the
status quo was based on a distortion of law, but what was worse
in Kennedy’s was that it fostered dispassion, detachment,
disengagement, and disenchantment with the law. 252
Kennedy is not alone in being political and socially critical
of the case method as well. Commentators have also attacked the
case method’s blindness toward a plurality of learning styles and
capacities in students. 253 Accordingly, in this vein, some have
also emphasized how the case method fetishizes abstract
reasoning over a more inclusive set of critical lawyering skills. 254
Others have examined the psychological aspects of the case
method and even unflatteringly portrayed aspects of it as
“infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic, a tactic for
promoting hostility and competition among students, self-serving,

Id. at 70.
Id.
250 See, e.g., id.
251 Id. at 72.
252 Id. at 73.
253 Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case
Against the Case System?, 36 J. Legal Educ. 167, 185 (1986).
254 See, e.g., Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of
Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J.
449 (1996).
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and destructive of positive ideological values.” 255 Scholars have
also observed that the way law schools teach the law exhaults
cold, hard doctrine over the “human aspects of lawyering—
variously called empathetic, affective, feeling, altruistic, and
service aspects of lawyering.” 256 Even more incisively, other
scholars have bemoaned that the case method’s sole weight on
appellate opinions obscures the importance of doctrinal analysis
to the exclusion of fact analysis in law practice, which can
arguably shift the emphasis away from doctrine. 257
In her existential assessment of law schools, Robin West
sees the case method’s distortion-dispassion correlation as
harboring serious implications for teaching justice in law schools.
West differs from others who link the case method to
amoralism. 258 Instead, she finds that contemporary American
legal education produces in a legalist way of engaging in the law
that is due to the sense of processual fairness students pick up in
case method reasoning starting in the first year and in the
method’s preference for performing horizontal equity, of treating
like cases alike. 259 Again, the case method’s artificial and
distorted placement of analytical rigor as superior lies at the
heart of this conditioning of law students. Coupled with the
legacy of Langdellian formalism that still remains, the result, as
West maintains, marginalizes the thoughts and teachings on
justice that bodes terribly for instilling a normative sense of
jurisprudence in law students. 260
These scholarly and critical observations about the case
method largely target the distortion of law behind the method. It
has not been hard for scholars to surmise that behind the
distortion reflected in the case method rests the mandate of
255

(1971)

Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 392, 407

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap By Narrowing the Field:
What’s Missing From the MacCrate Report–Of Skills, Legal Science and Being
a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593, 595-96 (1994) (citations omitted).
257 Jean R. Sternlight, Symbiotic Legal Theory and Legal Practice:
Advocating a Common Sense Jurisprudence of Law and Practical Applications,
50 U. Miami L. Rev. 707, 722 (1996).
258 West, supra note __, at 51.
259 Id. at 51, 56.
260 Id. at 88.
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Langdellian nineteenth-century formalism to objectify law,
according to its late nineteenth-century virtues. To see larger,
more damaging implications in that objectification of law,
postmodernist critiques of Langdellian formalism offers such
implications for contemporary legal education that are even more
basic and fundamental than the disconnect between teaching law
and justice that West had indicated.
As a tradition or condition of thought accentuated and
effected by questions of instability, postmodern experiences of the
law have challenged modernist conceptions of law for embedding
assumptions and establishments of objective and complete unity
in the law as part of a goal of legal modernists to find objective
truth in reality. 261
In this way, to juxtapose Langdellian
formalism next to postmodernism allows us to see—from a
phenomenological way, and even perhaps in an exaggerated
way—the trappings of the conception of law as science: “What
postmodernists do is intensify dissatisfaction with the narrowness
of professional knowledge about law.” 262 Specifically, postmodern
jurisprudence’s obsession with the politics of form and the concept
of the subjective in law has much to say about Langdellian
formalism.
While Langdell’s formalism perpetuated certain
ideals about law—its completeness, autonomy, neutrality, etc.—
and reinforced those ideals through its form—the case method—
to the point of objectifying the law as its own living, breathing
entity, postmodernism critiques the gaps in that endeavor,
noting that underneath the sorcery the ideals and norms are
never that neutral, complete, or objective.
Most notably, the politics of form and the concept of
subjectivity in postmodern legal thought has focused on the
missing subject in Langdellian conception of law and its
associated problems. 263 According to postmodernist thought,
Langdell’s legal conception of law as science objectified law in a
way that hid its first human author, Langdell, and its subsequent
authors as well. 264 As Pierre Schlag has observed, much of this
Minda, supra note __, at 354.
Id.
263 See generally Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev.
1627 (1991).
264 Id. at 1646.
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veiling or “effacement” of the author was effectuated through
ritualized rhetoric of the law as well as the act of inductive legal
reasoning. 265 Taking his contracts casebook as a prime example,
Schlag notes how Langdell interchanges authorial viewpoints
depending on whether he was writing about the law or whether
he was writing about pedagogy:
Whenever Chris [Langdell] addresses a matter of
pedagogy in his preface, the “I” is all over the place.
And yet, quite mysteriously, as soon as the law
makes its appearance in the preface, the “I”
vanishes. Chris disappears. Dean Langdell is
removed. Even you, the reader, begin to experience
a certain ego loss. Could it be God? Is it love? No,
it’s law—law and science: ‘Law, considered as a
science, consists of certain principles or doctrines . . .
. 266
Ritualized and repeated in this way, the law as voiced and
written by Langdellian formalists loses its authors and instead
the impression is that “Contract law does things; the rules speak,
the doctrine evolves and develops” and “[m]odern legal scholars
have since followed Langdell’s example; accounts of the subject
are rare in contemporary legal scholarship because subjectivity is
sublimated in legal forms and because only certain kinds of
subjects can be vested in these legal forms.” 267 As Gary Minda
seems to suggest, the Langdellian vision of legal science
encouraged this mimicry—“to write in the passive voice and to
rigorously maintain the detached demeanor of a scientist
conducting a controlled experiment” 268—which have resulted
experiences of the law by modern legal scholars that have been
“somehow ‘constrained’ and ‘bounded’ by law’s professional
method of analysis and orientation.” 269 What is worse is the lie of
disengagement: “And, yet, in removing their subjective presence
from their discussion of the law, modern legal scholars have also
Id. at 1648-56.
Id. at 1633-34 (referencing K. Burke, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES 355
(1945) (quoting Langdell, CONTRACTS, supra note __, at vi (1871))).
267 Minda, supra note __, at 380.
268 Id.
269 Id.
265
266
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assumed that they are capable of excluding their own personal
subjective identities from their work.” They “assume, in other
words, that they are becoming relatively empty, abstract, and
universal subjects-in-control of the law.” 270 The problem with this
ritualized uniformity and passivity that tries to embody a
mimicry of the scientific, as Minda implies, is that all of this
falsity, pretense, and subordination trickles down to professional
inculcation, which is what law schools are tasked to do: “Hence,
the expression ‘thinking like a lawyer’ makes sense because it is
thought that all lawyers think alike.’ ” 271
The established ritual of rhetoric of legal reasoning not
only subordinates its subjects but also its act of concealing
through language and the overshadowing of subjects by the
objectification of law makes any inquiries about that author
difficult to achieve. Here is how that emphasis of inductive legal
reasoning creates this hermetic problem as it contributes to the
objectification of law and at the same time minimizing the
subject: “Legal rules are explained, analyzed, and criticized as if
they were transcendental objects unaffected by analyzing
subjects.” 272 These attributes of rhetoric and reasoning under
Langdell is the crux of a popularlized formalist style. 273 In this
way, the law achieves objectification because “the law is a
transcendental object unaffected by social and economic
context” 274 and the result is prevention “from confronting the
hidden assumption of the autonomous legal subject.” 275
But postmodernism has uncovered the subject in law as
anything but an autonomous being. When the reveal is made
that “the subject is a problem,” the thought leads to a “serious
predicament” for legal scholars because the reality is that “[t]here
are many different subjects who interpret the law.” 276 So how
does one talk about the law or justify the law as transcendental,
neutral, complete, and autonomous when “the meaning of law
Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 381.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Schlag, Problem of the Subject, supra note __, at 1632-33.
275 Minda, supra note __, at 381.
276 Id. at 382.
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depends on the various constructions of different subjects”? 277
The identities of the “subjects-in-control of the law” matter. 278
What we are left with is the reality that law is “man-made,” not
its own living scientific entity that reflects universal truths of the
world, but something that reflects humanity—and undoubtedly
has reflected a certain kind of humanity, even under Langdell’s
order. 279 Meanwhile, we do not have a language for articulating
the law in this way, nor a reference point for this more realistic or
truthful point of view about law. This predicament is debilitating
for legal scholars because it makes them confront subjectivity.
Likewise as the politics of form and subordination of the
self/subject is reflected in the case method through the same
rhetoric and legal reasoning, the predicament is also
debilitating—or couched in Duncan Kennedy’s terms,
“disabling”—because in its continued use of the case method with
its objectification and distortions of law, law schools pass these
same problems about the subject in law to their students. 280
According
to
postmodernism,
this
dispassionate,
disengaged version of law and its case method subverts the
human in law by concealing subjectivity through it rhetoric and
formalist style and emphasizing an idealized, legalistic
objectivity. The lack of focus on the subject—in the context of law
school, students—and the lie that the subject does not exist has
serious ramifications. “Langdellian formalism reduces the subject
to a subordinate trivial role, the performance of that trivial role
remains essential to the ‘reading’ of the object order of law.” 281 If
that is the case, then American legal education is floating on an
ineffectual life raft on waters now revealed to be deeper and more
treacherous than we have known. Its methodology is irrelevant
and disempowering.
Yet, even with such postmodernist commentary nearly two
decades ago, American law schools continue to rely on
Langdellian pedagogy. Since even the realists, the academy has
Id.
Id. at 381.
279 Id.
280 See generally Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1681
(1996).
281 Schlag, Problem with the Subject, supra note __, at 1637.
277
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long-recognized Langdellian conception of law as science as
having some virtues but altogether unencompassing as a way to
study and develop law, but still the shell of the case method traps
law schools from progressing forward.
Prior to the recent crisis of legal education, Edward Rubin,
in a critical stance against the Langdell case method,
hypothesized reasons why the case method still persisted in law
schools, despite its outdatedness. 282 He had listed that the case
method’s “very obsolescence” had engendered an appearance of its
“immutability” so hard that “it seems less a tradition than a fact
of nature.” 283 First, the boat seems hard to rock. Additionally,
Rubin observed that the complacency created by the fiscal
powerhouses of law schools as money makers for universities and
law faculty members as beneficiaries reduce any competing urge
to change the status quo. 284 Now there’s reluctance to rock the
boat. And finally, Rubin offers one more reason that law schools
have kept the case method, which in part is self-defeating:
faculty members at law schools tend to read “a false appearance
of modernity” into the case method. 285 In staying on the boat and
not rocking it, we tell ourselves that the boat is truly state-of-theart in order to justify continual refrain from rocking the boat.
“Our failure to progress paints the Langdellian original with false
colors of modernity, misleading us into thinking that the
rationales for his curriculum correspond to our current
understanding of law, society, and education.” 286
Ten years has passed since Rubin’s observations. At least
one of his proffered justifications—the fiscal health and financial
stability of law schools—is no longer quite the case because of the
current and recent crisis of legal education. They are, borrowing
another of Duncan Kennedy’s phrases, quite the fiscal “tubs on
their own bottoms” as they might have been. 287 With that prong
no longer true, justification for keeping the case method afloat in
Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do
About It, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 609, 613-14 (2007).
283 Id. at 613.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 614.
286 Id.
287 Id.
282
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contemporary American law schools seems even more uncertain—
especially if the only reasons are the first and third ones that
Rubin mentioned. In an updated but still critical view about the
future of legal education in 2014, Rubin has given two trends in
society that may propel changes in legal education whether law
schools like it or not. 288 First is the rise of a knowledge-based
economy, in which “the increasing complexity of society in
general” and “legal expertise, as knowledge, . . . more central to
the sources of wealth in that new economy” will require a
restructuring of law schools that may include additional years
and intensity of instruction. 289 Currently, because law schools
still “retain[] an approach to pedagogy developed before Dewy,
Piaget, Montessori, and all the other founds of twentieth-century
education theory,” they “teach at the same level of specificity in
all three years. In effect, they are teaching three years of secondyear courses.” 290 Instead, Rubin suggest a graduated approach
where the first year is “more introductory and foundational” and
the third year is more interactive and advanced so that it “give[s]
students an opportunity to work in a more participatory and
interactive manner and to investigate one area of law in more
detail.” 291 The result is more subjectivity, empowering, and
relevance in learning law and practice so that students “develop
an appreciation for the complexity of modern law and an
understanding of the ways to deal with, and take advantage of
that complexity.” 292
Another concerning trend that Rubin examines is the
teaching of social justice in law schools: “The second major social
trend that is directly relevant to legal education is the ongoing
demand, both moral and political, for social justice.” 293 The
relevance is two-fold. First, intertwined with the knowledge
revolution is the rising need for “people to enforce their
traditional rights to the new products that our knowledge-based
Edward Rubin, The Future and Legal Education: Are Law Schools
Failing and, If So, How?, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 499, 507 (2014).
289 Id. at 510.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 513.
288
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economy is producing.” 294 Technology’s drive to complexity in life
will translate to protection and enforcement of individual rights
whether in private commercial law or criminal law. 295 Secondly,
such advancements and corresponding legal services will need to
be equally distributed and accessible to avoid social injustice. 296
But for now, “[t]he challenge is that the law school curriculum, in
its present form, is designed to train students to provide legal
services to corporations, wealthy individuals, and prosperous
small-town elites, not to the working classes or the
underprivileged.” 297 Rubin’s fault with the Langdellian method
here, in the realm of teaching justice, is similar to Robin Wests’
dissatisfaction. Others in the academic have similarly observed
justice teaching as a goal of contemporary law schools. 298
Rubin’s reasons for changing legal education and pedagogy
should prompt concern. But if the fundamental pedagogy of law
schools detaches the student from the law in the way that the
commentators above have described in service of a model of law
that overly objectifies and distorts the reality of the law and the
control and instrumentality of the law, then how do law schools
expect to empower their students to be capable legal thinkers, as
well as stay relevant to the actual nature of the law? Are law
schools just drifting on by, and is there a conception that could
support a new pedagogy? Part IV will introduce one concept that
seeks to address these issues.
IV. THE INSTRUMENTALITY CONCEPTION
To merely reconfigure the case method is to engender
further justifications for the method’s continuing use and legacy
in American legal education. Consequently, the solution in this
Part IV charts more fundamentally toward creating a
contemporary conceptualization of law rather than transplanting
Id. at 514.
Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Peter L. Davis, Why Not A Justice School? On the Role of Justice in
Legal Education and the Construction of A Pedagogy of Justice, 30 Hamline L.
Rev. 513 (2007); Anthony D’Amato, Rethinking Legal Education, 74 Marq. L.
Rev. 1 (1990).
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the practices of the Langdellian method into new waters—
essentially allowing it to linger afloat in American law schools for
educating and influencing further generations of lawyers. 299 The
intent here is to broaden and change existing pedagogical
traditions by conjuring the topic of law school study and inquiry—
that is, law—in ways beyond the system of a nineteenth-century
scientific legal paradigm in hopes to avoid the kind of
objectification discussed in Parts II & III, supra, and to bring the
Subject (or Subjects) of law explicitly into the study of it. To
arrive at this solution requires finding one underlying conception
of law—not necessary an all-encompassing one, but a conception
that will generate newer and less constricting ways to teach law
and lawyering, a conception that is less empirical and hopefully
less arrogant in its ambitions, one that can better facilitate
pluralism while focusing on relevance and empowerment. This
task is possible if we stop trying to categorize what law is in a
formalist way and instead begin examining and working with its
characteristics, inherent aesthetics, and effects. Thusly, the idea
of “law as instrumentality” seeks to do so in this manner.
Previous portions of this Article have inferred and explored
the fallacies of categorizing law as a unified body and how that
distortion seeps into pedagogical methods with critically
undesirable results. In part, the movements of American legal
thought that have followed Langdellian formalism—from
American legal realism to postmodernism—have exposed such
fallacies by their separate reactions to the assumption of law’s
complete unity and autonomy. 300 Each movement, in its own
thought, has identified gaps to the law that defy unity. 301 Such
observations could indicate either that these gaps exist in a
present state of modernism or that the modernist moment has
been entirely superseded by post-modernity. 302 Both possible
observations suggest that achieving unity in law is ultimately
impossible. 303 To know this truth of the matter, but to continue
preoccupying over unity and autonomy is debilitating after a
See Gilmore, supra note __, at 15 (referring to the case method
“indoctrination through brainwashing”).
300 See generally Minda, supra note __.
301 See generally id.
302 Id. at 388.
303 Id. at 389.
299
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while—especially if that while has lasted for more than a century.
Why then, other than intellectual and academic complacency, 304
do we still justify teaching only a limited set of ways to treat the
law by adhering to a pedagogy that embraces those fallacies?
Despite our modern considerations and presumptions of law and
its practices, why are we still setting sails to chase after a
mythical beast in the ocean in the way Langdell had once chased?
Conversely, studying law under a concept of its
instrumentality does not send out students to uncover a singular
unitary body of law only to watch them crash on rocky shores.
Law is not a mythical beast lurking out in the high seas for hunt.
Borrowing from Gertrude Stein, “there is no there there” in that
endeavor; no beast of that mythos awaits our capture, but only
intellectual cruelty in its mandate and the high possibilities of
being led off-course, of academic ship-wrecks, and rumors
transmitted across the high seas about legal education’s demise.
Instead, there are qualities existing in law and its practices
that prompt and beckon exploration. When we experience the
law, we experience its characteristics and effects. 305 Studying
and teaching law by starting with its instrumentalities is one way
of accessing the inquiry into law and the various qualities and
characteristics of its agency without the prerequisite of a ritual
established by the case method that is no longer justified by
Langdellian formalism.
A. Etymology and Ontology
In law, the word “instrumentality” has its resident usage
and definitions, but both its technical uses and meanings reveal
some degree of instability as well. Under Black’s Law Dictionary,
“instrumentality” is defined as primarily “[a] thing used to
achieve an end or purpose” 306 and then secondarily “a means or
agency through which a function of another entity is
accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body.” 307 The word
Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, supra note ___, at 505.
Jennifer L. Culbert, Shattering Law: Encounters with Love in Billy
Budd, 28 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 765 (2010).
306 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,10th ed. 2014).
307 Id.
304
305
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has its anchors in several different bodies of law, and both
primary and secondary meanings appear readily in usage. In tort
law, “instrumentality” appears in res ipsa loquitor and strict
liability cases and doctrines, typically serving as strawman or
proxy for broadly describing the harmful conduct or items that a
tortious actor can control to set in motion. 308 In the law of
business associations, instrumentality appears in the corporate
veil doctrine as the “thing” that corporate actors use to shield
their illicit activities behind the legal entity. 309 In the criminal
context, the Earl Warren majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio 310
penned the phrase, “instrumentalities of the crime,” in part, to
describe items directed in the act of police stop and frisk. 311 Of
course, more seemingly benign uses of “instrumentality” exist, for
instance, in federal statutory guidelines where “instrumentality”
could be a state or private agency 312 and, of course, in
employment law in the realm of entrustment and agency. 313 The
word in its current legal usage does not appear in some modern
legal dictionaries such as those reaching back to the late
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries—for instance, Irving
Browne’s Common Words and Phrases (1883) or the 8th edition of
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1914). However, in English law,
“instrumentality” is listed in F. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary
(1903): “[A] Solicitor is entitled to a charge for his costs on
property recovered or preserved through his ‘instrumentality.’ ” 314
Stroud’s specifically references the use of “instrumentality” in an
1885 Chancery opinion by an English court that referred to the
agency of an attorney and his work. 315 From the examples above
See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 458,
150 P.2d 436 (1944); E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855,
858 (10th Cir. 1949).
309 In re Hoffmann, 475 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012) (discussing
the corporate as “the alter ego or mere instrumentality of the shareholder” in
the test for corporate veil).
310 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
311 Id. at 25.
312
E.g., ¶ 1357.45 SERVICE FOR PUBLIC INSTITUTION OR
INSTRUMENTALITY, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 7536423.
313 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 239 (1958).
314 THE JUDICIAL DICTIONARY, OF WORDS AND PHRASES JUDICIALLY
INTERPRETED, TO WHICH HAS BEEN ADDED STATUTORY DEFINITIONS 988-89 (F.
Stroud ed. 1909).
315 Id. (quoting In re Wadsworth v. Sugden, 29 Ch. D. 517 (1885)).
308

2017]

LAW AS INSTRUMENTALITY

57

and others, we can see that the term embodies a degree of
instability and malleability, appearing in both public and private
areas of law; as a business entity or commercial activity; or a
dangerous item or an item in use of perpetrating a crime; as an
item possible of being controlled and used for a purpose. The
word, “instrumental,” at the root of “instrumentality,” helps to
connote usefulness or qualities in furthering a purpose 316 and
ultimately connects “instrumentality” to its meaning in legal
usage: agency. 317 But the degree of non-specification in the idea
of agency connotes neutral ambivalence—almost ironically, a
democratic one—that has allowed the word, “instrumentality,” to
be used in both benign and harmful legal contexts, as noted
above.
Of course, in legal theory and philosophy, the
“instrumental” root in “instrumentality” could also connote the
theory of pragmatic instrumentalism that has considerable
relevant dominance in American legal discourse. 318 This Article
relies on the suffix, “ity,” in “instrumentality” however, to sustain
its ambivalence from direct associations with that school of
thought. Instrumentality here can be “pragmatic” or not—just
like law’s instrumentality can be “pragmatic” or not. But in one
aspect or another, despite some variance, all of the results of this
quick etymology in modern legal vernacular points to
“instrumentality” in law as a quality describing a purposeful
function in its form.
Outside of law, the plain-meaning of “instrumentality”
share some overlapping characteristics to its usage in law, as nonlegal dictionaries continue to denote the word’s agency function;
however, some dictionaries recognize the word’s function more
explicitly as a quality and not the thing itself. As an example,
Merriam-Webster defines “instrumentality” as “[t]he fact or
quality of serving as an instrument or means to an end;
agency.” 319 Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
registers the meaning in the primary as “[t]he quality or condition
of being instrumental; the fact or function of serving or being
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note ___, at 919.
Id.
318 See R. Summers, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 23
(1982).
319
See
Merriam-Webster
Online,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/instrumentality.
316
317
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used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end; agency.” 320
Secondarily, the OED defines the word as “[t]hat which serves or
is employed for some purpose or end; a means, an agency.” In
tracing its usage historically, the OED lists discovery of its early
usage in religious contexts in the fifteenth century, in examples of
criticizing the agencies of a passive faith and the physical world
in relation to salvation and the Divine. 321 A comparative word,
“instrumentalness,” has a usage around the same time, also in
the religious context—also pejoratively describing the failings of
Its root words—“instrument” and
human nature. 322
“instrumental”—both have varied extensions in history. The
OED lists “instrument” being used later, though in a law context
to describe “a legal document.” 323 The word, “instrumental,” had
its “subservient” use and meanings in the fourteenth century. 324
This earlier use of “instrumental” and the later “instrument”
suggests that the actual root of the word “instrumentality” might
be “instrumental” and that its legal connotations was borne out of
the intervening uses of “instrument” that referred to legal
documents bearing some agency to accomplish legal effects.
From close readings of the OED’s identified earliest uses of
“instrumentality,” one could gather that “instrumentality” was
used in a much more materialistic and earthly connotation,
associated with mankind and not with the works and power of
God. Indeed, this conclusion could be bolstered by associations of
the root word, “instrumental,” (rather than “instrument”) with
the material. 325 But, as is presently within the OED, the word,
“instrumentality,” even despite materiality, has a broad usage
with an emphasis on the forms and qualities of agency. Both
religious and secular examples conveying this observation are
attached to the word’s primary and secondary meanings; beneath
the primary meaning in the OED, the word’s qualitative
connotations of agency have described human religious faith
(“Physicall instrumentality”), civil government (“instrumentality
320

1989).

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1052 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds.,

Id.
See id. (quoting reference to Satan’s instrumentality).
323 Id. at 1051.
324 Id.
325 Id.
321
322
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of men”), and even the handiwork of a particular person
(“instrumentality of Churchill”). 326 Its secondary meaning as
having an agency for some purposeful end has been used to been
used to compare the limits of physical nature versus God’s
omnipotent capabilities (“the subsidiary Instrumentalities of
Nature”), a type of philosophical agent of faith (“[t]he moral and
intelligent instrumentality”), illicit human corruption in
governance (“human instrumentality”), and an active force in
transforming civilization (“powerful instrumentalities”). 327 In
this way, it seems that the word’s currency is both in its slippage
to fit different contexts or modify various subjects, and in its
underlying objective to describe the qualities of purposefulness or
capabilities of something or someone—even if, as in one of the
religious examples above, its describes a capability (that of men)
that is not as useful compared to something else (God or the
Divine). Henceforth, as discussed infra, law as “instrumentality”
relies heavily on this explicit meaning of quality.
Other associations with the word “instrumentality” are also
possible. Beyond the legal and theoretical ideas of pragmatic
instrumentalism, “instrumentality” in the larger vernacular could
also remotely allude to John Dewey’s political pragmatic theory of
instrumentalism that “thought exists as an instrument of
adjustment to the environment.” 328 Again, the “instrumental”
word-root is the culprit. But likewise here, as in law, the use of
“instrumentality” rather than “instrumental” here seeks to
advocate for a similar ambivalence rather than a wholesale
import of that theory here. Also, the possible allusion to both
legal and non-legal philosophies ought to point to the word’s
slippage. As we will see below, by emphasizing an umbrella
usage, the word’s instability likens its use here with some—
though not all—indefinable qualities of the postmodern
condition. 329 It offers an extensive and versatile use—though it is
ultimately not completely comprehensive or, at least, so
comprehensive that it swallows its meaning. 330 Also what has
Id. at 1052.
Id.
328 Id.
329 Feldman, supra note ___, at 38.
330 In this way, the postmodern resonance or slippage in reading the word
“instrumentality” for the purposes of establishing a conception of law in this
326
327
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instrumentality might also be relative to whom or what that
instrumentality serves. And lastly the irony for now is that the
word could quite possibility embody a teleological posture through
its functions to describe agency or goals—which postmodernism
tends to reject. 331 Facetiously, the metaphysical conceit would be
“instrumentality”’s
inherent
“instrumentalism”
or
“instrumentality.” Later parts of this section will try to reconcile
both teleological and postmodern perspectives in the
instrumentality conception. What is clear here, for now, is that
“instrumentality” for the purposes of this Article’s premise can
and ought to embody a certain degree of vagueness.
The negotiation of this word between its broad definitions
as a legal term of art and its even more expansive applications in
the plain language is where this Article seeks to begin using the
fluid currency of the word for application within the thought of
Article harkens to the debate in critical legal studies about the functions of
queer and feminist theories. For instance, Shannon Gilreath has observed that
Queer theory, with its celebration of sexual violence and death
and its pointed rejection of law as a means to change, is anchored
in this kind of unreality because it is detached from gay people's
experiences. This is not to say, of course, that those people
postulating queer theory are not entitled to a claim to experiences
that matter or are real, but only to say that queer theory proceeds
from a posture that is swallowed by its particularities. . . . Queer
theory is, in this respect, either remarkably cruel or its
progenitors are really quite far removed from the realities most
women and gay people face. Force and sexual abuse seem a lot
less like a lovely academic game of charades when you are the one
with the fist in your face. As an opposite of queer theory, “A
feminist theory and practice attempts to account for the
fracturing of reality, and then to make reality whole again.”
Shannon Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91
Denv. U. L. Rev. 109, 137 (2013) (citing Andrea Dworkin, LIFE & DEATH:
UNAPOLOGETIC WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN 118
(1997)) (quoting Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist
Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 Harv. Women’s L.J. 25, 37). Because of its
implicit normative nature, as we will see infra, the “law as instrumentality”
here resembles feminist theory in comparison to Gilreath’s narrowly described
gestures toward reality.
331 Anthony E. Cook, Foreword: Towards A Postmodern Ethics of Service,
81 Geo. L.J. 2457, 2466 (1993).
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law as instrumentality. Of course, this quick etymology is not
exhaustive. But in this brief explication, the study reveals that
“instrumentality” is certainly a noun with an inherent strawman
quality that prompts further inquiry. Its limits, of course, are not
endless; indeed, its contours are also fitted within the
characteristic of agency or facility for the purpose, agency, or ends
of something else.
That something else, of course, could be law itself.
Importing the definition and slippage of the word above, studying
law as instrumentality could mean learning the law and its
practices by starting from instability and reaching toward the
qualities of instrumentality in law first in order to examine and
seek meaning—looking at moments where the law has
instrumentality and when the law fails to embody it. From there,
these observations of instrumentality lead us to an ontological
perspective that uncovers a pluralism of possible perspectives of
what law is: what its purpose is; how it is created and practiced;
where or in what form is it situated; what reasoning goes into
that practice; who creates, practices, or benefits from the law;
what condition is the political system that embody law; what
theories and histories have shaped its perpetuation in form and
content; and so on. 332 Instrumentality is the tangible pressure
point that provokes intellectual and practical meanings. By
looking at the qualities of a law that purports to have agency in
fulfilling certain goals, a study based on “law as instrumentality”
would seek out various types of questions to achieve
understanding and knowledge.
In examining the instrumentalities, we can pose
descriptive questions about the underlying purpose of that law
and how it is effectuated: What goals or policies does the law
accomplish or seeks to accomplish? And how do the aspects of its
form and practice do that? And to what extent are these
instrumentalities successful? We can critique philosophically and
normatively: Are such goals just or moral? Are they socially or
politically efficacious? Are they political goals? Are any bigger
goals? Should there be other goals that the instrumentalities do
not fulfill? Or we can ask questions about the actors (or the
332

Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, supra note ___, at 640-41.
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Subject(s)) within that instrumentality: Who accomplishes those
goals through law as instrumentality? Whose goals are they?
Who benefits, directly or indirectly? Who can access that
instrumentality? Correspondingly we can ask and study what
skills are involved in that creating that instrumentality: How
does the actor or subject control such instrumentalities to
accomplish those goals behind a certain law? Procedurally or
strategically through a type of reasoning? How could we do it
better? An instrumentality conception, in this way, serves as a
broad reference point of critique and understanding and learning
about law; it does not accept goals behind a certain
instrumentality in law and therefore does not embrace the
teleology that a certain law seeks to demonstrate. In fact, an
instrumentality conception in law ought to use instrumentality to
discuss the success and failings of such agency and the degrees of
accomplishments of such goals veiled behind law.
Though its fixation is partly teleological, this approach to
law through study of its instrumentality and critique of law’s
subservience rather than endorsing its teleology offers a
postmodern alignment with the instrumentality conception. The
same questioning from above can and ought to be applied to
critique and study not merely of law or particular bodies of law,
but also political systems and institutions that effectuate the law,
the process of creating law, and conceptualizations of law: How
are the instrumentalities of a certain law or a legal regime
furthering the ends of liberalism? Neoliberalism? Morality?
Distributive justice? Or just fair deals between private actors?
Similarly through instrumentality, we can seek out questions in
regards to a particular legal doctrine: What instrumentalities
allow the parol evidence rule to accomplish judicial efficiency?
Can it be better? Should we be concerned about judicial efficiency
when the matter of establishing a meeting of the minds involves a
tremendous forfeiture for one party? Or ideas about law: Does
pragmatic instrumentalism have any instrumentalities as a way
of creating and interpreting law?
Through an ontological observation and critique that bears
on
the
law’s
descriptive,
normative,
and
practical
instrumentalities, studying law in this way in spirit results in a
methodology that can reveal the philosophies, the realities, the
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practice, the falsehoods, the inefficiencies, the histories, the
politics, and many other things about the topic of law—without
having to assume its completeness in the method. The method
does not have to be inductive, nor does the Socratic need to be
wholly abandoned. They should just be options, among others, at
the podium. The law has agency potential and thus has qualities
that assume instrumentalities, which then reveal other
characteristics and motivations we place upon the law. Whether
law ought to have agency (or not) is a philosophical and
metaphysical question that can also be part of the lecture hall
debate for future lawyers as well. Why should the law embody
instrumentality? How do we contribute to that instrumentality?
This perspective stretches this instrumentality conception as an
epistemology. In comparison, although the concept that “law as
science” does asserts in its content a normative assumption that
law ought to be scientific, the phrase is more descriptive because
of the more concrete object of its modifier (science). Steering our
inquiry and definition of law toward its instrumentalities and
away from a presupposed scientific nature makes the inquiry less
confining and, hopefully, much more resonating in meaning.
B. The Instrumentality Methodology in Four Steps
Within this Article’s subtext has been the ontological idea
that one’s conception of law affects how one objectifies law and
thusly how one studies it. In that way, as this subsection will
show, the instrumentality conception is no different than the
Langdellian conception in the way that can be translated into a
methodology.
However, as we will see as well, the
instrumentality conception’s broader and more neutral
preoccupations lead to a more encompassing style of gathering
meaning in law.
Under the instrumentality conception, a
methodology for investigation of law by its instrumentalities can
be framed in four sequential steps: (1) establishing instability or
gaps in law; (2) observing the fragments of law created by the
instability that exemplify instrumentality; (3) forming meaning
about law from such instrumentality; and (4) connecting meaning
with relevance and empowerment. Using a course on the law of
contracts as an example hopefully illustrates an application of
these four sequential steps.
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First, a first-year contracts course could create a contextual
instability by beginning without law at all, but rather a societal
want or need—for instance, the desires for human survival and
societal advancement. 333 The tension here is the supposition that
without a system (or even a plan), achieving these desires or
needs might be very difficult or impossible. The instability is
further externalized if we notice that in order to advance or even
survive, resources must be shared between individuals framed
possibly by a sense of cooperation. 334 Agreements are helpful to
facilitate the cooperative exchange of resources within a
society. 335 But how does a society, in order to advance or even
survive, make sure that its members are able to agree to
exchange resources and thus cooperate? Human nature, after all,
keeps its limits on altruism. Hence, a need emerges for a system
of contract-making to verify that agreements are made and kept,
and to give recourse when agreements fail. Now the instability is
in the qualities of what that system of agreements would look
like. Historical examples of contracting can now be brought into
the course to show students how past societal traditions have
created these systems by using law. What specifically does this
legal system of contracting need to emphasize? Perhaps a legal
system of contracting need to recognize trust, good faith, fairness,
honesty, and clarity as important values in agreement-making. 336
Perhaps such a legal system ought to underscore individual
freedom to make contracts—as much freedom as the political
body that houses such a legal system would allow. 337 Or perhaps
See, e.g., Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 132-33 (Michael Oakeshott ed.,
MacMillan 1977) (1651); John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True, Original,
Extent and End of Civil Government: Second Treatise on Government, in
SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 10-11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1690); Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 141
(Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ’g 1987) (1762).
334 Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 Fla. L.
Rev. 1, 15 (1999) (“Appeal to a social contract can foster the spirit of
cooperation and compromise.”).
335 See generally John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
336 See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“ Every
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.”).
337 E.g., Christina Eberl-Borges & Su Yingxia, Freedom of Contract in
Modern Chinese Legal Practice, 46 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 341, 345 (2014)
(“[I]n China, freedom of contract is granted--unlike in Western legal systems-333
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it should just dictate that individuals must cooperate or suffer
some societal punishment. We would need rules of law to further
the values selected within the various governing ways
agreements could be made. Now suddenly the instability seems
less unstable, and we start to see the instrumentality of law
arising in the realm of contracts.
From sociological and anthropological imperatives about
agreement-making, the course can now move into step two of
harvesting the specifics of a system of contracting law. From the
fragments of what values a contract law system might promote in
order to sustain and advance a society, students can be made to
examine specifically what kinds of rules such a system requires
by looking at the system of contracting that has developed in
American jurisprudence. There might be need for rules on how
parties form agreements, who can form agreements, and what
happens when formed agreements are then breached. All of these
rules ought to, in their own ways, reflect the overarching societal
goals of human survival and advancement but along the way the
combination of values of trust, freedom, honesty, good faith, and
anything else that buttresses the agreement-making process
must also be reflected. What students should encounter at this
stage are the gaps that prompt them to ponder what else do they
need to know; or prod their curiosities to find out what such rules
look like in form, and how the law can make happen the
endorsement of the societal values it serves.
Step
three
requires
actual
engagement
with
instrumentality—here in contract law, that would mean
encountering the form in which such instrumentality arises
through reading cases and statutory material, such as the
Uniform Commercial Code, the (Second) Restatement of
Contracts, or The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). 338 It could also mean
encountering the content of instrumentality in the rules of
contract law and seeing for instance, that the rules of contract
by ordinary law, not by the Constitution. It follows that no special
constitutional protection applies to freedom of contract in China. This is a
substantial difference from freedom of contract in the Western sense.”).
338 E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
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formation in American jurisprudence requires, in part, an
externalized offer and acceptance process, in which a meeting of
the minds is approximated. 339 The instrumentality of these rules
might be examined in multiple layers: How do these rules serve to
create agreements? How easily do these rules serve to create and
facilitate contracts?
What are required and how are they
externalized by facts, language, and conduct of parties? How do
all of these rules combined serve the ends of societal advancement?
Or in the same realm of contract formation, students can be asked
to see that the consideration requirement in American
contracting tradition tries to underscore the value and
importance of voluntary inducement and freedom of contracting.
How do the rules for consideration effectual those values? What
contours are highlighted in such rules—e.g. bargained-for
exchange and immediacy—that supposedly reflect such values?
They might be asked to contrast consideration rules in American
contracting traditions with the lack of consideration requirement
in other contracting systems internationally. 340
Here, students can continue their evaluation of the law by
tying their inquiries here to previous inquiries in step one
regarding the advancement of societal goals—whether the nature
of whatever law being discussed fulfills those goals that the
course acknowledged in step one. But step three is also the
moment in the sequence where students begin acquiring
reasoning skills by reading cases or breaking down complex
statutory rules and materials. If the course emphasizes American
contract law, step three is where students receive training on
reading cases critically, but also practically; where students learn
the level of authorities in contract law; where students interpret
statutory materials and/or contractual documents; where
students are introduced to factual analysis and making inferences
to facilitate legal arguments and possibly other skills a professor
would reasonably ascertain as essential for law students to

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note ___, at § 18.
See, e.g., Amy Lee Rosen, Chinese Contract Formation: The Roles of
Confucianism, Communism, and International Influences, 20 U. Miami Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 189 (2013) (“China only requires offer and acceptance whereas
the United States requires mutual assent and consideration[.]”).
339
340
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acquire in encountering contracts materials. Thus, step three is
both knowledge-based and skills-based.
In teaching with a pedagogy that emphasizes law as
instrumentality, step four is where hopefully students uncover
meaning within the law that is relevant and empowering to them.
For instance, continuing with the lesson on contract formation,
step four might be where students learn how to use the
instrumentalities of the rules for formation to argue objectively
and persuasively on behalf of parties in litigation. Now we move
from instrumentality in a knowledge-based inquiry to instruction
that is strictly more experience-based. Essentially, the exercise
illustrates instrumentality or agency in the relevant skills of
lawyering while it personalizes that engagement of skills.
Another exercise might draft students into learning how to craft
contract formation provisions or rules that better effectuate the
societal goals that ought to be reflected in such rules, but are also
mindful of how certain parties and entities do business.
Specifically, this exercise might just involve legislating over one
rule or statute but it would also allow students to see
instrumentality in language that effectuates law, or see
instrumentality in the legislation of laws. Again, the exercise is
experiential but the experience seeks to personalize the
engagement by placing the student as the subject of the law. Or
perhaps another exercise here in step four could be transactional:
How do we as attorneys draft agreements that abide by rules of
formation and to maintain the best interest of clients? The
students can be given a factual scenario involving the negotiation
of a transaction (a house, an important service, a requirements
contract over goods, etc.) and some differing parameters for each
party. Then they are asked to draft agreements that follow the
rules of formation, advance the personal goals of each party, and
maintain the value society places on free exchange of resources
for advancement. Here, this example illustrates instrumentality
within legal documents but also develops drafting skills and
experience needed for those students who are headed to
transaction practice. Hopefully as they gather the knowledge on
the law’s instrumentalities in the context of formation rules in
contracts, these exercises allow them to transfer that knowledge
to create a more meaningful interaction with the law and
lawyering. By allowing them to take the meaning they have
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obtained in their observations about instrumentalities in steps
one to three and transfer such learning to experiences in step
four, students understand that they are the subjects of law. Step
four reveals both relevance and empowerment—relevance in
seeing how lawyering requires both knowledge and skills
regarding the instrumentalities of law and empowerment in the
active experience in manipulating and controlling those
instrumentalities in the law classroom laboratory.
Thus, reaching from instability to the qualities of the
contract formation law that underscores its instrumentality
shows students both the qualities and the content of the law on
contracting behavior in a particular society. After students’
interactivity in acquiring knowledge about the law through such
qualities in their study of the cases, statutes, and materials, their
experiences of such knowledge in step four in the lawyering
process—whether arguing, rule-making, or drafting in the context
of simulation—creates empowerment for the students for
engaging in law in the classroom laboratory.
Through
instrumentality, they become the Subjects that give the Object of
law its animating life.
Other law courses can be taught with the instrumentality
conception. A good use of the four-step process is in the law of
remedies, for when essentially laws fail—its instrumentality
breaks down in remedial relief—and equity must be invoked to
order to achieve desired goals of justice or redress. Legal
remedies are inadequate in certain situations—perhaps money is
not fast enough or suitable enough to address a nuisance dispute,
or not sufficient enough to deal with infringement of civil
rights. 341 Or perhaps it is a declaration of some sort that a
claimant requires, rather than money. 342 In this context, the
fragmentation of law occurs contextually as law’s failing (step
one). Within the gaps of that fragment, students must find the
purpose of remedies and seek out the instrumentality of equitable
relief (step two). Equitable relief in its various forms through
Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES--EQUITY--RESTITUTION
86 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the adequacy rule for equity); see also id at 90
(discussing “constitutional rights” as a category subject to equitable relief).
342 See id. at 53.
341
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case law and statutes demonstrate to students an alternative
route to redress by governing conduct or allowing a judicial
proclamation. Then students must acquire actual knowledge of
equity and its functions through cases and discussions of how
equity functions—for instance, learning the types of declaratory
remedies, injunctive relief, and specific performance orders
available and learning how to build a case for such devices (step
three). Finally, students work through simulations where they
draft persuasive requests for equitable relief, and in particular
not overlooking the ability to craft the remedy portion of a
hypothetical that essentially a court would adopt to enjoin
another’s conduct (step four). They can also critique the limits of
what can be accomplished. Did the remedy that they drafted
ultimately accomplish something that was sincerely efficacious or
just? Lawyers must know what it is they are reaching for and
how to do all of these things. They should also know the
difference between constructs and limits of jurisprudence.
Hopefully, by teaching equity through instrumentality, students
understand the concepts of law and equity and are empowered
with transfer of that knowledge, not only in litigating toward a
remedy, but also in crafting and then critiquing a remedy.
C. Instrumentality in the Curriculum
Within an instrumentality conception, there might also be
further benefits in the law school curriculum. By viewing law as
instrumentality, an indirect consequence might be the
democratizing of courses that were once segregated by subject
matter divisions and given more importance if they were
doctrinal courses as opposed to interdisciplinary courses or
contextual ones—such as legal history, race and the law, feminist
legal theory, law and philosophy, jurisprudence, and the like.
The hierarchy could erode to elevate the significance of these
courses that were once considered, according to Duncan Kennedy,
as part of the “finishing school” of being a lawyer343 or those that
reflect diversity and plurality in the curriculum if the approach to
teaching law as instrumentality in doctrinal classes is also
transferred to these classes by questioning where is the
instrumentality of law in relation to the subject matter. In other
343

Kennedy, supra note ___, at 61.
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words, the instrumentality conception is broad enough to apply to
such courses precisely if such courses are taught in a way that
makes students see the instrumentality of law within a historical,
jurisprudential, comparative, theoretical, or otherwise contextual
narrative. In this way, the pedagogy works into the relevance of
courses in upper-level law programming. Moreover, for courses
framed within a certain perspective—such as race, gender, or
sexuality—an instrumentality conception across the curriculum
would enable the exploration of subjectivity in law without
perceptions of content marginalization raised by the dominance of
doctrinal courses that tend objectify law. By de-emphasizing the
objectification of law, an instrumentality conception would be
more conducive to valuing subjectivity in the academy. This, in
turn, would bode well for pluralism in law teaching.
Likewise, as law as instrumentality emphasizes students’
capabilities and role in facilitating instrumentality, clinical and
experiential learning opportunities in law schools would have a
better co-curricular alignment. For instance, law schools could
more thoughtfully program curricular sequences to balance out
the transfer of learning from traditionally doctrinal courses (such
as contract law) with associated advanced doctrinal courses (such
as commercial law or business associations) and/or skills courses
(such as contracts drafting) in upper-level offerings and finally
experiences in likeminded clinical courses or externships (such as
transactional clinics or work in commercial litigation). The
empowerment effect in the instrumentality conception might
create more meaningful experiences for students in those upperlevel experiential opportunities. The fundamental courses in the
first year would converse with experiential learning opportunities
and courses in the second and third years of study.
Ultimately, this pedagogy through instrumentality
responds to students in ways that juxtapose them as the Subjects
of law by instilling their relevance in the material and facilitating
their empowerment. Learning is goal oriented. 344 Relevance

Timothy W. Floyd, Oren R. Griffin, & Karen J. Sneddon, Beyond Chalk
and Talk: The Law Classroom of the Future, 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 257, 264-65
(2011) (discussing goal-oriented learning).
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facilitates learning. 345 Law as instrumentality is a more relevant
pedagogical concept because it responds to reasons why people
attend law schools: to become lawyers. 346
What studying
instrumentality does is ask the student to explore how the law
works and what can be accomplished through its creation and its
practices—what lawyers need to know about the law and its
application. Thus, as seen in the examples above, teaching
through this instrumentality conception can lead to more
immediate engagement. In addition, this conception allows for
teaching and inquiry on the contextual and philosophical
questions about the law that add to law’s profound
personalization and meaningfulness for students. One way to
encapsulate the trajectory of this method is by positing its
reverse-engineering approach to the law. Let us just assume that
that the law is ultimately unknowable. But aspects of the law
that are observable ought to be used for study—its functions, its
accomplishments, its qualities and characteristics, its authors, its
degrees of effectiveness for accomplishing goals through practice
and theorizing, even the failings of its instrumentalities, and the
teleological assumptions of those instrumentalities. In practical
and moral terms, our answers to such questions as posed by all of
these observations are what the instrumentality conception
attempts to render in its immediacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Rather than self-destructive behaviors akin to rocking the
boat or jumping ship, this Article has tried to conjure a sense of
redemption through progress by charting a new direction in the
philosophy of teaching in American legal education—one that is
reflective of plurality and hopefully enlivens thoughtful, critical,
and energizing debates in the academy for the rescue and
salvation of American legal education. As introduced in these
pages, the instrumentality conception directs us away from the
objectification of law by not embracing the aesthetic preferences
of the Langdellian formalists but looking more ontologically in the
Id. (discussing relevance in learning).
See, e.g., Kyle P. McEntee & Patrick J. Lynch, A Way Forward:
Transparency at American Law Schools, 32 Pace L. Rev. 1, 56 (2012) (noting
“most people attend law school to become lawyers”).
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belief that the instrumentalities of law can lead to the
acknowledgment of subjectivity and eventually, meaning and
understanding. The only objectification of law that occurs in the
instrumentality conception does so in larger relation to the
Subject of the law because the conception allows us to
acknowledge our study more transparently when the act of
inquiry involves acknowledging our own sifting through of the
fragments of law in order to draw relevant meaning that
emboldens our capabilities to advance law and also to critique
that advancement. A perspective from instrumentality, thus,
tames the law for its Subject—for our students, and ultimately for
us, as we all bring law to life. Henceforth, this conception allows
us to transfer the meaning of law back to an instrumentality
within our control.
To be sure, the former conception of law as science and its
reflected pedagogy in the case method has had its place in the
study of law and training of lawyers, and ought to have a
presence in the future, as it would have within an
instrumentality conception—just like case law has its continuing
importance in our legal system. But it would become only one
kind of method, amongst a variety of methods in the same way
that case law is only one kind of law. Thus, the dominance of the
case method should be lessened to make way for other methods
and realities of law; and it would be lessened within the
instrumentality conception.
Ultimately, the conception, as methodology, seeks to reveal
law’s relevance and use its demonstrative experiences to empower
individuals. Lawyers have agency, and thus transitively, they
personify the instrumentality of law as well. 347 Accordingly,
future legal inquiries through instrumentality will lead to
questioning how lawyers contribute or embody agency. This hope
at the heart of that conception’s directive is to reveal the human
in law in order to better educate lawyers. American law schools
and legal education also possess agency and instrumentality. Our
Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on
the Technicalities, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 973, 1027 (2005) (“What defines the
technical as a sphere of social practice, in other words, is lawyers’
commitments to an aesthetic of instrumentality, not simply to an
instrumentalist politics or project.”).
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current and future students will become the stewards and
captains of legal knowledge, thought, and practice long after the
current cries of crisis have passed.
The instrumentality
conception would imbue them with knowledge and technique
relevant to their present and future stations in the law and
engages them to find meaning and power inwardly so that they do
not just learn to think like lawyers but also to transform. This
vast and noble possibility in the lecture halls of law schools is
ultimately the instrumentality that the academy must embody in
revealing law’s meaning.

